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QUIRIN REVISITED 
A. CHRISTOPHER BRYANT AND CARL TOBIAS* 
INTRODUCTION 
Six decades ago, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ex parte Quirin, 1 
in which the Justices determined that President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt possessed the requisite constitutional authority to institute and 
use a military comm1ss1on. That military comm1ss10n 
contemporaneously tried, found guilty, and recommended sentences, 
which the Chief Executive promptly imposed on, eight Nazi saboteurs. 
Before the commission ruled, the Supreme Court rejected the 
defendants' petitions for writs of habeas corpus. 
On November 13, 2001, President George W. Bush promulgated an 
Executive Order (Bush Order) that authorized the establishment and 
application of military commissions as well as purported to eliminate 
whatever jurisdiction federal courts might have by statute and to deny 
federal court access to individuals prosecuted or detained for terrorism. 2 
The Bush administration substantially premised that the Order and 
jurisdiction-stripping proviso on Ex parte Quirin. It has also invoked 
the opinion when adopting related measures that implicate the war on 
terrorism and when litigating major terrorism cases. 
We recently argued that the jurisdiction-stripping provision of the 
Bush Order exceeded the president's lawful authority, 3 a result 
necessitated by the U.S. Constitution4 and by the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 5 Our previous 
work explicitly left unaddressed, as beyond its scope, any evaluation of 
* A. Christopher Bryant, Associate Professor, William S. Boyd School of 
Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Carl Tobias, Beckley Singleton Professor, 
William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. We wish to thank 
Raquel Aldana, Margaret Sanner, and Ingrid Brunk Wuerth for valuable suggestions, 
Judy Canter for processing this article, as well as Beckley Singleton and James E. 
Rogers for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are ours. 
1. 317 U.S. 1 (1942). The Court issued this full opinion three months after a 
brief per curiam order. See id. at 18. · 
2. See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War 
Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 921 (2001), reprinted in IO U.S.C.A. § 801 (West Supp. 
2002) [hereinafter Bush Order]. 
3. See A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373 (2002). 
4. See u .s. CONST. arts. I & Ill. 
5. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See generally Bryant & Tobias, supra note 3. 
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what issues might be cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding to review 
ongoing detention or a final judgment imposed under the Bush Order. 6 
The government will almost certainly assert that a federal court 
entertaining a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus filed by, or on 
behalf of, someone whom the Bush Order covers, may only determine 
whether a military commission has valid jurisdiction over the person. 
This idea was foreshadowed when White House Counsel Alberto R. 
Gonzales observed that the Bush administration would submit to a 
federal habeas corpus proceeding, only insofar as the petitioner 
challenged the lawfulness of the commission's jurisdiction.7 The White 
House Counsel and additional upper-echelon governmental officials base 
the limitation, the Bush Order, and similar antiterrorism initiatives on 
Ex parte Quirin. 
We believe, however, that the ruling may not support such a 
circumscribed view of the jurisdiction that a federal habeas corpus court 
would exercise today. Rather, Quirin must be understood vis-a-vis its 
historical context, which includes the strikingly underdeveloped nature 
of federal habeas corpus at that time. Since 1942, the Justices have 
dramatically enlarged federal habeas corpus proceedings' scope. Before 
this date, the fact of adjudication by a competent tribunal alone would 
sustain the writ's denial, yet federal habeas corpus courts now 
frequently resolve substantive challenges to the manner in which 
admittedly lawful tribunals conducted proceedings. One instructive 
example is that a few years before Quirin, a trial court's failure to 
provide counsel for an indigent criminal defendant would only rarely 
have supported a petition for the writ. By sharp contrast, modem 
federal habeas corpus courts frequently grant relief to petitioners 
afforded lawyers whom judges later find rendered ineffective assistance. 
We suggest that Quirin' s correct interpretation emphasizes the Supreme 
Court's decision to exercise jurisdiction and to resolve the case on the 
merits-perhaps most significantly the Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
claims. 
In short, the profound growth of federal habeas corpus over the last 
sixty years, the opinion's unusual facts, and the quite narrow holding in 
the Quirin Court's ultimate determination must guide contemporary 
application of the precedent. Thus, our research finds that federal 
courts have power not only to assess military commissions' validity in 
the abstract but also to review whether their treatment of particular 
defendants satisfied the Constitution. 
6. Bryant & Tobias, supra note 3, at 377 n.10. See generally Bush Order, 
supra note 2. 
7. See Alberto R. Gonzales, Mania/ Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 30, 2001, at A27. 
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Part I of this Article evaluates the Bush Order that created the 
tribunals and ostensibly nullified federal court jurisdiction, while briefly 
explaining why the President lacks constitutional authority to preclude 
this jurisdiction and canvassing his administration's reliance on Quirin. 
Part II then scrutinizes the decision and ascertains that the ruling should 
be confined to its peculiar facts. Part III next details federal habeas 
corpus's evolution since the 1940s. Finally, Part IV asserts that Quirin 
must be modernized to conform with twenty-first century habeas corpus 
law and concludes by surveying the types of issues that might be 
cognizable in a habeas corpus court, even though an anachronistic, 
unduly rigid and insupportably overbroad construction of Quirin may 
appear to prohibit their merits disposition. 
I. THE BUSH ORDER AND QUIRIN 
The November 2001 Bush Order, which authorized the 
establishment and use of military commissions, while purportedly 
abolishing federal court jurisdiction, deserves rather brief treatment here 
because certain applicable issues have received extended discussion 
elsewhere. 8 However, some exploration is warranted, as that analysis 
should improve understanding of the Bush administration's dependence 
on the Quirin case and its relevance to the Bush Order's constitutionality 
and application, especially in the context of federal habeas corpus 
proceedings. 
On November 13, 2001, President Bush promulgated an Executive 
Order that authorized the creation and deployment of military 
commissions as well as ostensibly abrogated federal court jurisdiction 
over tribunal proceedings; the Bush administration in essence grounded 
that Order and its attempt to preclude federal court jurisdiction on the 
Quirin opinion, Article II delegated powers, and Congress's September 
2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution. 9 
Numerous observers have found that the President does not have the 
authority to eliminate federal court jurisdiction, a conclusion ~ictated by 
Articles I and III and by the Supreme Court's Youngstown holding, 
8. See Bryant & Tobias, supra note 3. See generally Laura A. Dickinson, 
Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions, 
International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407, 1412-35 
(2002); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the 
Military Tribunals, lll YALE L.I. 1259 (2002); Symposium, Youngstown at Fifty: A 
Symposium, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (2002). 
9. See Bush Order, supra note 2; see also Authorization for Use of Military 
Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, ll5 Stat. 224 (2001). 
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although military tribunals may be legitimate in certain situations, such 
as extraterritorial prosecutions that result from declared wars. 10 
Most relevant for the questions that this Article addresses, the Chief 
Executive, Cabinet members and a significant number of other top-
ranking public figures have employed the Quirin decision to substantiate 
related actions in the war on terrorism and to pursue and defend crucial 
terrorism litigation. The country's elected leaders have proffered the 
ruling in a highly generalized manner. When President Bush justified 
the Order, he alluded to the opinion by mentioning how the Roosevelt 
administration had implemented an analogous World War II initiative; 
President Bush stated that "[n]on-US citizens who plan and/or commit 
mass murder are . . . unlawful combatants" and they might receive trials 
before military commissions, if those proceedings would foster the 
"national-security interest. " 11 On November 14, 2001, Vice President 
Richard Cheney similarly cited the Quirin decision and the application 
of military tribunals as the major precedents for establishing military 
commissions, while he remarked that the entities should try the 
individuals responsible for the terrorist attacks who do not "deserve the 
same guarantees and safeguards that would be used for an American 
citizen going through the normal judicial process." 12 
The same day, at a press conference, Attorney General John D. 
Ashcroft subscribed practically verbatim to the notions that the Vice-
President had expressed by recounting tribunals' "very substantial 
history," Supreme Court recognition (most importantly in Quirin) that 
the entities are valid, and his personal opinion that "foreign terrorists 
10. See, e.g., Bryant & Tobias, supra note 3; Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and 
Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military Governance in a Madisonian 
Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 649 (2002); Gonzales, supra note 7. We do not 
address the geographic scope of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction in this Article; we 
leave for another day such questions as those raised in A. F. Al Odah v. United States, 
321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the privilege of litigation did not extend to 
aliens in military custody outside of U.S. territory). 
11. Wayne Washington, Fighting Terror Legal Considerations: FDR Move 
Cited in Tribunals, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 2, 2001, at Al; see Mike Allen, Bush Defends 
Order for Military Tribunals, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2001, at Al4. President Bush 
subsequently justified tribunals by urging Americans to remember that those who would 
be tried "are killers. They don't share the same values that we share." President's 
Exchange with Reporters in Alexandria, Virginia, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 469 
(Mar. 25, 2002). 
12. See Vice President Richard Cheney, Remarks to the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce (Nov. 14, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/ 
news-speeches/speeches/vp20011l14-1.html; see also Interview by Vice President 
Richard Cheney with Gloria Borger, 60 Minutes II (Nov. 14, 2001), available at 
http://www. whitehouse. gov /vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20011114.html. 
See generally Michal Belknap, A Putrid Pedigree: The Bush Administration's Military 
Tribunals in Historical Perspective, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 433, 434 (2002). 
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who commit war crimes against the United States ... are not entitled to 
and do not deserve the protections of the American Constitution." 13 
Three weeks later, the Attorney General correspondingly proffered 
testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee: the "Quirin case upheld 
the use of commissions in the United States against enemy belligerents," 
while the Justices exercised "habeas corpus jurisdiction to decide" on 
the tribunal's legitimacy and "whether the belligerents were actually 
eligible for trial under the commission. "14 In a June 10, 2002 
Department of Justice (DOJ) briefing, Deputy Attorney General Larry 
Thompson observed that the U.S. government had detained Jose Padilla 
"under the laws of war as an enemy combatant," and the Deputy 
Attorney General relied on the Quirin precedent as "clear Supreme 
Court [authority] for such a detention. "15 
DOJ Assistant Attorneys General, who are discharging lead 
responsibility to pursue the war on terrorism, have invoked the World 
War Il determination. The Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal 
Division, Michael Chertoff, when defending the Bush Order's 
promulgation before the Senate Judiciary Committee, supplied numerous 
arguments: the language used was "virtually identical" to that in the 
Roosevelt Proclamation and Order; commission application has enjoyed 
a long history, which the Assistant Attorney General traced; the 
Supreme Court recognized tribunals' constitutionality with the Quirin 
opinion; and Chertoff's acknowledgement that commission deployment 
"in the United States would be subject to habeas review by the Federal 
courts. "16 The Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal 
Policy, Viet D. Dinh, whom some observers consider the "chief 
architect of Ashcroft's aggressive new approach to law enforcement," 
has similarly claimed that the venerated American tradition of 
13. Attorney General John Ashcroft & INS Commissioner Ziglar, 
Announcement of INS Restructuring Plan (Nov. 14, 2001), available at http:// 
www .usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarksll _ I4.htm; see also John Turley, 
Military Tribunal Rules Put Our Values to Test, BALT. SUN, Mar. 25, 2002, at 7A. 
14. Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing 
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, I07th Cong. 322, 327 (2002) [hereinafter 
Preserving Our Freedoms} (statement of Att'y Gen. John Ashcroft). The Attorney 
General recounted the venerable history of commissions once again. Id. 
15. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Conference on the Arrest of Abdullah al 
Mujahir, Also Known as Jose Padilla (June 10, 2002) (statement of Deputy Att'y Gen. 
Larry Thompson), transcript available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/rights/law/ 
02061001.htm; see infra text accompanying notes 33-34. 
16. See Preserving Our Freedoms, supra note 14, at 52 (statement of Assistant 
Att'y Gen. Michael Chertoft); see also infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. 
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employing military commissions sustained the Bush Order's institution. 17 
The Assistant Attorney General emphasized how the Roosevelt 
administration had applied tribunals during World War II, while Dinh 
cited Quirin for the propositions that the "Supreme Court has 
unanimously upheld" the entities' validity and the President's authority 
to convene them. 18 
Officials who head the Department of Defense (DOD) have 
proffered several analogous concepts which support the Bush Order and 
the March 21, 2002 DOD regulations that implement it. 19 Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul 
Wolfowitz tendered a statement for the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, observing that "[m]ilitary commissions have been used in 
times of war since the founding of this Nation" and alluding specifically 
to the Roosevelt administration prosecution of the eight Nazi saboteurs; 
both officers claimed the "Supreme Court upheld" tribunals' legitimacy 
in Quirin. 20 The Deputy Secretary elaborated by suggesting that the 
"President does have a lot of authority; [however, the World War II 
decision] was precisely a case of where the courts reviewed whether that 
authority was properly exercised" and concluded that it had been. 21 The 
Department General Counsel, William J. Haynes II, submitted testimony 
that reinforced the perspectives that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz enunciated 
and elaborated: the Bush Order was the same as the Roosevelt Order 
and was not intended to modify Supreme Court habeas corpus scrutiny. 22 
Moreover, the General Counsel invoked the Quirin precedent when 
substantiating the March 2002 department regulations, while he argued 
that "Presidents have detained enemy combatants in every major conflict 
17. See Siobhan Gorman, The Ashcroft Doctrine, NAT'L J., Dec. 21, 2002, at 
3712, 3713; see also Eric Lichtblau with Adam Liptak, On Terror, Spying and Guns, 
Ashcroft Expands Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2003, at Al. 
18. See Viet D. Dinh, Foreword: Freedom and Security After September 11, 25 
HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 399, 405-06 (2002); see also infra notes 26-34 and 
accompanying text (recounting DOI reliance on Quirin in major terrorism litigation). 
19. Bush Order, supra note 2; Military Commission Order No. 1 (U.S. Dep't 
of Defense Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/mco/ 
mcol.pdf [hereinafter DOD Order]; see Turley, supra note 13. 
20. See Depanment of Defense's Implementation of the President's Military 
Order on Detention Treatment and Trial by Military Commission of Cenain Noncitizens 
in the War on Terrorism: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Servs., 107th 
Cong. 9, 11 (2002) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Sec'y of Def. Donald Rumsfeld 
& Deputy Sec'y of Def. Paul Wolfowitz). 
21. Id. at 68; see also Nat Hentoff, Spinning the Military Tribunals: A Mere 
Pretense of Legal Process, VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 2, 2002, at 27. 
22. See Hearing, supra note 20, at 17 (statement of DOD Gen. Counsel 
William J. Haynes II); see also supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
2003:309 Quirin Revisited 315 
in the Nation's history" and that federal courts have affirmed the power 
of chief executives to deploy military tribunals. 23 
White House Counsel Gonzales also relied on Quirin for the 
propositions that the Justices have "consistently upheld" military 
commissions' application, and he clearly recognized that the terms 
incorporated in the Bush Order were derived from wording of the 
Roosevelt administration Proclamation and Order, phraseology which 
the Supreme Court construed as permitting habeas corpus review. 24 The 
White House Counsel concomitantly asserted that any "habeas corpus 
proceeding in a federal court" that challenges actions under the Bush 
Order that authorize trial of non-U. S. citizens by military commissions 
would be limited to reviewing "the lawfulness of the commission's 
jurisdiction. "25 
The Justice and Defense Departments have correspondingly placed 
substantial dependence on the Quirin opinion when litigating a 
significant percentage of the terrorism cases. These include most 
prominently Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, which was pursued in the Eastern 
District of Virginia and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit, as well as Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, which is proceeding 
before the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit. 26 For 
example, the brief submitted by the government to assert its position in 
one Hamdi appeal contended: "given the constitutionally limited role of 
the courts in reviewing military decisions, courts may not second-guess 
the military's determination that an individual is an enemy combatant 
and should be detained as such. "27 Fourth Circuit Chief Judge J. Harvie 
Wilkinson Ill, trenchantly reformulated this argument in an appellate 
court opinion: the United States "thus submits that we may not review at 
all its designation of an American citizen as an enemy combatant-that 
23. News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., DOD Responds to ABA Enemy 
Combatant Report (Oct. 2, 2002) (quoting Letter from William Haynes II, DOD General 
Counsel, to Neal Sonnett, Chair, ABA Task Force on Enemy Combatants (Sept. 23, 
2002)), available at http://www. defenselink. mil/news/Oct2002/ 
b10022002_bt497-02.html. The Fourth Circuit recently reaffirmed these ideas in 
Hamdi. See infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text; see also Jonathan Turley, The 
Military Pocket Republic, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (2002). 
24. See Gonzales, supra note 6. See generally Bryant & Tobias, supra note 3, 
at 394-95 n.85. 
25. See Gonzales, supra note 6. See generally Tom Brune, Military Couns to 
Vary on Rules, NEWSDAY, Dec. 1, 2001, at A2. Senators' views similar to the 
administration's are in the hearings cited supra notes 14, 16, 20. 
26. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 2002); 
Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), adhered to 
upon reconsideration, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
27. Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283. 
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its determinations on this score are the first and final word. "28 
However, the Fourth Circuit flatly denied as premature the 
government's request to dismiss the petition and elaborated: "In 
dismissing, we ourselves would be summarily embracing a sweeping 
proposition-namely that, with no meaningful judicial review, any 
American citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant could be detained 
indefinitely without charges or counsel on the government's say-so. "29 
When the Fourth Circuit remanded the matter, District Judge Robert 
Doumar asked "what, if any, constitutional protections Hamdi was 
entitled to," and counsel for the United States "responded that the 
Constitution applied to the same extent as 'it did to the individual who 
was alleged to be an American citizen in the Quirin case. "'30 "Upon 
further questioning by the court," the lawyer conceded that this person 
"was afforded access to counsel and the opportunity to defend himself 
before a military tribunal, "31 while the trial judge found it apparent that 
the Quirin petitioner received a "significantly broader measure of due 
process than Hamdi has received thus far" in part because he had been 
confined to the Norfolk Naval Brig without an attomey.32 The district 
court that resolved the Padilla litigation similarly rejected the 
government's argument that Padilla should not have access to counsel,33 
but the judge did find "the logic of Quirin bears strongly on this case," 
extensively citing the decision that "recognized the distinction between 
lawful and unlawful combatants" and that "[u]nlawful combatants are 
likewise subject to capture and detention. "34 
A large number of public officials, especially those who hold 
cabinet-level, and additional upper-echelon, Bush administration 
positions, therefore, have invoked the World War II precedent of Ex 
parte Quirin. These figures, namely President Bush and certain top-
ranking legal officers, have depended on the ruling for many important 
propositions in numerous contexts and for ideas which the opinion may 
not support. 
This Article's next Part, thus, considers Ex parte Quirin, the World 
War II decision on which the President and his aides extensively relied 
when issuing the November 2001 Bush Order and when fighting the war 
28. See id. 
29. Id. The Fourth Circuit did extensively cite to Quirin for ideas, such as the 
following: "And in World War II, the [Supreme] Court stated in no uncertain terms that 
the President's wartime detention decisions are to be accorded great deference from the 
courts." Id. at 282 (citing Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25). 
30. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 532 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
31. Id. 
32. See id. at 529, 532. 
33. · See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 600. 
34. Id. at 594-95 (emphasis added). See generally Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30-31. 
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on terrorism. We review whether the case supports the notions for 
which the Bush administration proffers the opinion and determine that 
Quirin cannot sustain most of them. For instance, the President and his 
assistants at once extend the decision far beyond its circumscribed, sui 
generis facts and narrowly-confined holding to substantiate broad 
concepts, such as indefinite detention of U.S. citizens and great judicial 
deference vis-a-vis the Executive, even while those public officials 
apparently ignore federal habeas corpus's exponential growth over the 
last sixty years. Perhaps as troubling, a few courts have already 
subscribed to the administration's interpretation of the precedent. 
II. ANALYSIS OF EX PARTE QUIRIN 
In evaluating Quirin, we first assess its unique factual context. We 
then explore the decision's legal analysis and holding, and we explain 
why many phenomena should limit the reach of Quirin. These include 
the speed with which the United States prosecuted the saboteurs and the 
Supreme Court resolved their appeals; the difficulties of rationalizing the 
full opinion after the government depended on a hastily-assembled, 
laconic per curiam order to execute six of the petitioners; as well as 
improper exogenous pressures, most critically from President Roosevelt, 
and questionable internal ones, principally from Justice Felix 
Frankfurter. The determination was also narrow, and its author, Chief 
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, intentionally wrote a circumscribed opinion, 
which many observers suggest should be narrowly read. 
A. The Facts in Quirin 
The unusual facts that underlie Ex pane Quirin warrant 
considerable exploration in this Article because they support a confined 
reading of the holding. Our recitation of the pertinent facts derives 
substantially from the factual rendition that the Supreme Court decision 
articulated and the perspectives enunciated by informative secondary 
sources, which have carefully and thoroughly scrutinized the relevant 
particulars. 35 
After the United States had declared war against the German Reich 
in 1941, Adolph Hitler demanded expeditious action against the nation 
35. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20-22; see also Michal R. Belknap, The Supreme 
Coun Goes to War: The Meaning and Implications of the Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MIL. 
L. REv. 59 (1980); David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, 1 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 61 
(1996). See generally LoUIS FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL (2003); EUGENE 
RACHLIS, THEY CAME To KILL: THE STORY OF EIGHT NAZI SABOTEURS IN AMERICA 
(1961). 
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on U.S. soil. 36 The German High Command, therefore, devised a plan 
that included military and propaganda objectives because the scheme 
required that the saboteurs destroy bridges, aluminum factories, and 
railroads as well as train stations and department stores throughout the 
United States.37 Over the course of a month in spring 1942, experts 
instructed the saboteurs on detonators, explosives, invisible writing, and 
other relevant techniques at a special training installation outside 
Brandenburg, Germany. 38 
Four of the saboteurs then proceeded to a seaport that was located 
in Occupied France and boarded a submarine that traveled across the 
Atlantic Ocean and planted them and a supply of explosives and 
detonators at Amagansett Beach, Long Island early on the morning of 
June 13, 1942.39 They landed, dressed wholly or partly in German 
Marine Infantry uniforms, which they buried upon reaching shore, and 
thereafter journeyed to New York City wearing civilian clothes.40 Four 
additional saboteurs departed on another submarine from the identical 
French port. This second group came ashore, dressed in German 
Marine Infantry caps and transporting similar destructive paraphernalia, 
at Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida under the cover of darkness on June I7.41 
These individuals buried their caps and the explosive materials, donned 
civilian dress, proceeded to Jacksonville, and subsequently dispersed to 
various destinations across the United States.42 
At least two saboteurs decided that they might be saved through 
betrayal of their remaining colleagues, and one traveled to Washington, 
D.C., where he provided the FBI with a thorough confession.43 By June 
27, accordingly, the FBI had placed all eight saboteurs in custody. 44 
36. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21; see also Danelski, supra note 35, at 61. See 
generally FISHER, supra note 35, at 4; Cyrus Bernstein, The Saboteur Trial: A Case 
History, 11 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 131, 132 (1943). 
37. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21; Robert E. Cushman, Ex parte Quirin et al.-
The Nazi Saboteur Case, 28 CORNELL L. Q. 54, 54-55 (1942); Danelski, supra note 35, 
at 61, 63. 
38. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21; Danelski, supra note 35, at 63. See generally 
FISHER, supra note 35, at 1-23. 
39. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21; Cushman, supra note 37, at 54; Danelski, supra 
note 35, at 63. 
40. See supra note 39. See generally FISHER, supra note 35, at 25-32. 
41. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21; Cushman, supra note 37, at 54; Danelski, supra 
note 35, at 64. 
42. See supra note 41. See generally FISHER, supra note 35, at 35-38. 
43. See Belknap, supra note 35, at 62; Bernstein, supra note 36, at 136; 
Danelski, supra note 35, at 64-65. 
44. See supra note 44. The FBI issued misleading press releases that suggested 
that its diligence led to the arrests. These issuances marked the beginning of 
"government control on information about" the case and its successful use for 
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The FBI Director, J. Edgar Hoover, orchestrated a press conference that 
day to announce their capture, while some members of the media 
beseeched the government to impose prompt, ruthless retribution. 45 
In a June 30 memorandum, which President Roosevelt prepared for 
Attorney General Francis Biddle, the President articulated his personal 
opinions that the individuals being held surely "are just as guilty as it is 
possible to be" and that "[o]ffenses such as these are probably more 
serious than any offense in criminal law. "46 The President, therefore, 
concluded that "[t]he death penalty is called for by usage and by the 
extreme gravity of the war aim and the very existence of our American 
Government," urging that the people captured "be tried by court 
martial. "47 The Attorney General first conferred with the Secretary of 
War, Henry Stimson, and the Judge Advocate General, Myron Cramer, 
and then suggested to the Chief Executive that a military commission be 
assembled to try the saboteurs. 48 Biddle specifically recommended trial 
by commission because he thought this approach would be rather 
expeditious, make it easier to prove the charge of violating the law of 
war, and permit the death penalty's imposition. 49 The Attorney General 
also harbored concerns related to secrecy, in particular that there not be 
embarrassing revelations about the facility with which the saboteurs had 
landed on U.S. shores and the comparatively inept FBI treatment of the 
matter at the war's outset. so 
On July 2, Roosevelt promulgated an Executive Order that 
instituted a military commission, appointed its members, the prosecutors 
and the defense counsel; established the procedures the tribunal would 
use to conduct the proceeding; and prescribed review of the trial record 
propaganda purposes. Danelski, supra note 35, at 64-65; accord Preserving Our 
Freedoms, supra note 14 (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
45. Belknap, supra note 35, at 62-63; Bernstein, supra note 36, at 137; 
Danelski, supra note 35, at 65. 
46. See Memorandum for the Attorney General, President Roosevelt to 
Attorney General Biddle (June 30, 1942) (President's Secretary's Files: Departmental 
File: Justice Department, 1940-1944) (on file with the Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Presidential Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.). 
47. See id. See generally Jonathan Turley, Quirin Revisited: The Dark History 
of a Military Tribunal, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 28, 2002, at Al7. 
48. See Memorandum from Attorney General Biddle, to President Roosevelt 
(June 30, 1942) (President's Official File (OF)5036: Nazi Spies, 1942-1945) (on file 
with the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.) [hereinafter 
Memorandum]. 
49. See Belknap, supra note 35, at 63-64; Danelski, supra note 35, at 66; see 
also FISHER, supra note 35, at 49-51. 
50. Danelski, supra note 35, at 66; see also Belknap, supra note 35, at 66-67; 
Katya! & Tribe, supra note 8, at 1280-81. See generally supra notes 43-44 and 
accompanying text. 
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and any commission judgment or sentence.51 The Order deviated from 
requirements in the Articles of War by authorizing the admission of 
evidence which had probative value for a reasonable person; conviction 
and imposition of a death penalty sentence on a two-thirds, rather than a 
unanimous, vote; and direct transmittal of the record, judgment and 
sentence to the Chief Executive for review. 52 Biddle informed Roosevelt 
that the departures prescribed "should save a considerable amount of 
time," but they would also facilitate the saboteurs' conviction as well as 
imposition of the death penalty. 53 The same day, the President issued a 
Proclamation that ostensibly closed the federal courts to "persons who 
are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war with the United 
States . . . and are charged with committing or attempting or preparing 
to commit sabotage, espionage . . . or violations of the laws of war. "54 
Biddle intimated to the President that this July 2 Proclamation would 
"produce the same practical results" for the saboteurs as suspending the 
habeas corpus writ, yet it would avoid suspension's "broad policy 
questions. "55 
On the next day, the Army Judge Advocate General filed with the 
military tribunal charges that the eight saboteurs had violated the law of 
war: Article 81 of the Articles of War, which implicated relieving the 
enemy; Article 82, which involved spying; as well as conspiracy to 
commit the abovementioned offenses.56 Soon thereafter, the commission 
began the trial, which was held in complete secrecy in a converted FBI 
assembly room with blacked-out windows in the DOJ building. 57 The 
proceeding continued for three weeks. The lawyers for the saboteurs, 
Army Colonels Cassius Dowell and Kenneth Royall, doubted that the 
Order and Proclamation were constitutional or valid and decided that 
51. Exec. Order No. 9185, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 2, 1942); see also 
Danelski, supra note 35, at 67. 
52. Exec. Order No. 9185, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 2, 1942). See generally 
Danelski, supra note 35, at 67. 
53. See Danelski, supra note 35, at 67; Memorandum, supra note 48. 
54. See Proclamation No. 2561, 3 C.F.R. 309 (1938-1943); see also Quirin, 
317 U.S. at 22-23. See generally FISHER, supra note 33, at 50-53; supra notes 2, 9, and 
accompanying text. 
55. Memorandum, supra note 48; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; Ex parte 
Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 147 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487); see also WILLIAM H. 
REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 32-42 (1998) 
(discussing Merryman); Belknap, supra note 35, at 65 (citing Memorandum, supra note 
48). 
56. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 23; see also Bernstein, supra note 36, at 141-43; 
Danelski, supra note 35, at 67. 
57. Belknap, supra note 35, at 66. The government stated that the commission 
was conducting the trial in secret for security reasons. See id.; Espionage: 7 Generals 
v. 8 Saboteurs, TIME, July 20, 1942, at 15. 
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they would contest both in federal court. 58 However, the defense 
attorneys, as military officers, were concerned because pursuing the 
matter in civilian tribunals might be viewed as an act of disobedience 
toward the Commander in Chief and, thus, they wrote the President and 
sought authority for the legal challenge on July 6.59 Biddle counseled 
Roosevelt against officially denying the request and, therefore, the 
presidential secretary, Marvin Mcintyre, contacted the lawyers and 
instructed the attorneys to exercise their best judgment. 60 Dowell and 
Royall then responded that the defense would file habeas corpus 
proceedings, which provoked an irate reaction from Roosevelt who 
informed the Attorney General: "I won't hand them over to any United 
States marshal armed with a writ of habeas corpus. "61 
On July 8, when the tribunal convened, Royall proclaimed that the 
Order that established the comm1ss1on was "invalid and 
unconstitutional" and began to develop a strategy for challenging it. 62 In 
late July, Biddle and Royall persuaded Justice Hugo Black and Justice 
Owen Roberts that the Supreme Court should entertain the case, while 
the jurists convinced Chief Justice Stone to convene a special session of 
the High Court that would receive the saboteurs' petitions for writs of 
habeas corpus.63 On July 28, the defense lawyers filed applications for 
habeas corpus writs in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia, which the district court promptly rejected. 64 The following 
day, the attorneys filed habeas corpus petitions in the Supreme Court. 65 
During oral argument before the Justices, the lawyers appealed the 
district court's determination to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit and when that request was denied filed 
58. See RACHLIS, supra note 35, at 181-82; Belknap, supra note 35, at 67; 
Danelski, supra note 35, at 68. 
59. See Letter from Cassius Dowell & Kenneth Royall to President Roosevelt 
(July 6, 1942) (President's Secretary's Files: Departmental File: Justice Department, 
1940-1944) (on file with the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, 
N.Y.). See generally FISHER, supra note 35, at 56-59, 64-65; Belknap, supra note 35, 
at 68 (citing Letter from Dowell & Royall to President Roosevelt, supra). 
60. See FISHER, supra note 35, at 65-66; Belknap, supra note 35, at 68; 
Danelski, supra note 35, at 68. 
61. See FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 331 (1962); see also Danelski, 
supra note 35, at 68. 
62. See Belknap, supra note 35, at 68 (citing Transcript of Trial Proceedings, 
Map Room Papers, Boxes 198-201, at 4 (on file with the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, 
Hyde Park, N.Y.)). See generally FISHER, supra note 35, at 56-57. 
63. See FISHER, supra note 35, at 67-68; RACHLIS, supra note 35, at 210-12, 
243-46; Danelski, supra note 35, at 68. 
64. See Ex pane Quirin, 47 F. Supp. 431 (D.D.C. 1942); see also Quirin, 317 
U.S. at 19. 
65. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 19; Danelski, supra note 35, at 68; see also 
FISHER, supra note 35, at 68. 
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certiorari petitions in the Supreme Court, which the Justices granted on 
the day that they affirmed the district court action and dismissed the 
petitions for habeas corpus writs. 66 
Attorneys for the government and for the petitioners labored under 
enormous temporal restraints; however, they managed to file briefs 
which comprised more than 180 pages on July 29, the initial day of 
Supreme Court oral argument. 67 The Court heard those arguments over 
five and one-half hours on July 29 and for three and one-half hours the 
following day .68 Prior to commencement of the initial oral arguments, 
Chief Justice Stone and all the other Court members except William 0. 
Douglas, who was traveling from Oregon, met in conference for a 
preliminary discussion of the case.69 Justice Roberts, whom Stone had 
asked to preside, informed his colleagues that the Attorney General 
believed Roosevelt would execute the saboteurs regardless of how the 
Court decided their appeals. 70 Justice Frankfurter also questioned the 
propriety of having Justice Frank Murphy hear the matter, because the 
jurist was serving as a reserve army lieutenant colonel on active duty at 
the time, while Justice Murphy, who wished to participate, reluctantly 
concluded that he must withdraw, "lest a breath of criticism be leveled 
at the Court. "71 
The Justices promptly resolved the case. Less than twenty-four 
hours after the lawyers had finished their oral arguments, the Supreme 
Court convened to issue a cursory per curiam order. Chief Justice Stone 
reviewed the litigation's history, stated the Court would announce the 
Justices' determination, and explained that the Supreme Court would 
subsequently file a full-dress opinion that explicated its reasoning. 72 The 
brief per curiam order found that Roosevelt possessed sufficient 
constitutional authority to try the petitioners before a military 
66. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 19-20; Danelski, supra note 35, at 68. For a 
descriptive account of the procedural machinations whereby the "Court's jurisdiction 
caught up with the Court just at the finish line," see Boris I. Bittker, The World War II 
German Saboteurs' Case and Writs of Certiorari Before Judgment by the Court of 
Appeals: A Tale ofNunc Pro Tune Jurisdiction, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 431 (1997). 
67. See Danelski, supra note 35, at 68. See generally FISHER, supra note 35, 
at 87-88. 
68. Belknap, supra note 35, at 75. For summaries of the arguments proffered 
by the United States and by the petitioners, see id. at 70-75; Danelski, supra note 35, at 
68-69. See generally FISHER, supra note 35, at 89-108. 
69. Danelski, supra note 35, at 69. 
70. See id. Stone remarked, "[tlhat would be a dreadful thing." Id. 
71. See Belknap, supra note 35, at 78 (citing Note to Ed (Kemp) (Sept. 10, 
1942) (Frank Murphy MSS, Michigan Historical Collections, Univ. of Mich.)); see also 
SIDNEY FINE, FRANK MURPHY: THE WASHINGTON YEARS 256, 404 (1984); ALPHEUS 
THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 654-55 (1956). 
72. Belknap, supra note 35, at 76-77; Danelski, supra note 35, at 71. 
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comm1ss1on, the chief executive had lawfully established the tribunal, 
and the saboteurs had "not shown cause for being discharged by writ of 
habeas corpus. "73 The Supreme Court, therefore, dismissed the 
petitioners' applications for habeas corpus writs and affirmed the district 
court. 74 
The proceeding conducted by the military commission, which had 
been discontinued while the appeals were being pursued in the Supreme 
Court, expeditiously resumed. 75 On August 1, the attorneys presented 
closing arguments, and two days later, the commission found all of the 
defendants guilty of the charges against them and recommended death 
sentences. The tribunal submitted the 3,000-page record, which it had 
compiled directly to the President for his consideration and action. On 
August 8, the White House announced that Roosevelt had accepted 
virtually all of the commission's suggestions, although the Chief 
Executive commuted sentences, which the tribunal proposed for the two 
saboteurs who had defected.76 The identical day, the government 
electrocuted the remaining six petitioners. 77 The President then sealed 
the record in the case throughout the duration of World War II. 78 
Chief Justice Stone consumed more than six weeks agonizing over 
the draft of the full opinion for the Court.79 The jurist posited a 
basically intuitive rationale to support the decision, yet his law clerks 
found "little authority" for this justification while Stone could only cite 
analogous cases at numerous crucial points in the draft and even 
formulated alternative versions of its last segment. 80 On September 16, 
after the Chief Justice had finished crafting the opinion, he wrote 
Frankfurter: "About all I can say for what I have done is that I think 
[the draft opinion] will present the Court all tenable and pseudo-tenable 
73. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 18-19; see also RACHLIS, supra note 35, at 272. 
74. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 18-19; see also supra note 64 and accompanying 
text. 
75. We rely in this paragraph on RACHLIS, supra note 35, at 281, and 
Danelski, supra note 35, at 71. 
76. Belknap, supra note 35, at 77; Danelski, supra note 35, at 72. 
77. Danelski, supra note 35, at 72. Roosevelt reportedly hoped that the 
military commission would recommend death by hanging. See WILLIAM D. HASSETT, 
OFF THE RECORD WITH FDR, 1942-1945, at 90, 97 (1958). 
78. See Bernstein, supra note 36, at 188-89; see also Danelski, supra note 35, 
at 72. 
79. We rely in this paragraph on Danelski, supra note 35, at 72-75. 
80. See Danelski, supra note 35, at 72 (citing Letter from Chief Justice Harlan 
Fiske Stone to Bennett Hoskey (Aug. 9, 1942) (on file with the Harlan Fiske Stone 
Papers, Library of Congress)). See generally infra notes 129-32, 135, and 
accompanying text. 
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bases for decision. "81 Justice Frankfurter stated the iteration satisfied 
him completely, and he had "nothing to contribute except 
appreciation. "82 On September 25, Stone circulated the proposed 
opinion and a memorandum, suggesting that some questions which 
defense counsel aired in July had not been before the Justices but 
asserting the issues should be resolved against the saboteurs, lest the 
Court be "in the unenviable position of having stood by and allowed six 
men to go to their death without making it plain to all concerned-
including the President-that it had left undecided a question on which 
counsel strongly relied to secure petitioners' liberty. "83 
Several Justices, however, were less sanguine than Frankfurter. 
Illustrative was the concern expressed by Justice Roberts that the 
decision might be construed in a manner which would legitimate the 
Roosevelt administration's effort to nullify federal court jurisdiction and 
his recommendation that the Justices explicitly find the President lacked 
this authority. 84 Frankfurter responded with a strong plea for judicial 
restraint, while he said the Proclamation should not "be read as 
foreclosing inquiry into what it means as applied to this case and . . . we 
should rest there and not open up what verily is a Pandora's box. "85 
Roberts and the remaining brethren found the proposed resolution 
acceptable, and Stone incorporated this suggestion in the draft opinion. 86 
Justice Black correspondingly voiced the idea that the draft could be 
interpreted as an overbroad endorsement of military tribunals' use and, 
thus, "might go far to destroy the protections declared by the [Ex parte] 
Milligan case. "87 Stone, therefore, implemented changes in the opinion 
81. Danelski, supra note 35, at 75 (alteration in original) (citing Letter from 
Chief Justice Stone to Justice Felix Frankfurter (Sept. 16, 1942) (on file with the Harlan 
Fiske Stone Papers, Library of Congress)). 
82. Danelski, supra note 35, at 75 (citing Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter 
to Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone (n.d.) (on file with the Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, 
Library of Congress)). "[You face and resolve] issues of high moment ... in a manner 
worthy of them." Id. 
83. Belknap, supra note 35, at 78 (citing Memorandum from Chief Justice 
Harlan Fiske Stone, for the Court (Sept. 25, 1942) (on file with the Harlan Fiske Stone 
Papers, Library of Congress)). 
84. Danelski, supra note 35, at 75 (citing Suggestions Made By Justice Owen 
Roberts to Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone (n.d.) (on file with the Frankfurter Papers, 
Harvard Law School)). 
85. Id. at 75-76 (citing Justice Felix Frankfurter to Chief Justice Harlan Fiske 
Stone (Oct. 15, 1942) (on file with the Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Library of 
Congress)). 
86. Id. at 76. 
87. Id. at 76 (citing Justice Hugo Black to Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone 
(Oct. 2, 1942) (on file with the Hugo L. Black Papers, Library of Congress)); see also 
infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text. 
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that satisfied Black's concerns.88 Justice Douglas proffered one 
important proposal requesting the omission of a sentence in the draft that 
provided: "Even the guilty are entitled to be tried by a tribunal and by 
laws which the Constitution has prescribed as a means of determining 
their guilt. "89 The jurist thought that the sentence could be construed as 
finding it "unlawful for the executive to have disposed of the petitioners 
summarily without a trial by a tribunal. "90 Douglas argued that the 
question was not before the Court and the issue should be left 
unaddressed, while Stone agreed and deleted the objectionable 
sentence. 91 
Once the Chief Justice had negotiated the modifications above, 
Stone focused on the application of two provisions in the Articles of 
War over which the Court's members were evenly split and for which 
he had drafted alternative versions.92 Justice Frankfurter favored 
Memorandum B, stating that the Articles of War did not bind the Chief 
Executive, and the jurist attempted to persuade several of his colleagues 
throughout the summer. 93 However, Frankfurter did not convince 
Justice Stanley Reed, and Frankfurter lost a supporter when Justice 
James Byrnes resigned from the Supreme Court on October 2.94 The 
ensuing half-month witnessed little movement related to the question. 
Nonetheless, on October 16, Justice Robert H. Jackson circulated a 
memorandum that resembled a concurrence, a development that 
particularly disturbed Stone, Frankfurter and Black, who had earlier 
agreed that securing unanimity was imperative.95 Jackson believed the 
Court exceeded its powers "in reviewing the legality of the President's 
order[, while] experience shows the judicial system is ill-adapted to deal 
with matters in which we must present a united front to a foreign foe. "96 
88. See Danelski, supra note 35, at 76. 
89. Id. at 76 (citing Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas to Chief Justice 
Harlan Fiske Stone (Oct. 17, 1942) (on file with the William 0. Douglas Papers, 
Library of Congress)). 
90. See id. 
91. See id. (citing Memorandum from Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, for the 
Conference (Oct. 17, 1942) (on file with the Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Library of 
Congress)); see also Belknap, supra note 35, at 78. 
92. See Danelski supra note 35, at 76; supra note 80; infra notes 129-32 and 
accompanying text. 
93. Danelski, supra note 35, at 76 (citing Memorandum by Justice Felix 
Frankfurter to Justices Owen Roberts, Stanley Reed, & James Byrnes (Aug. 1942) (on 
file with the Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School)). 
94. Id. (citing Letter from Justice Stanley Reed to Justice Felix Frankfurter 
(undated, received Sept. 13, 1942) (on file with the Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law 
. School)). 
95. See id. (citing Memorandum from Justice Robert H. Jackson (Oct. 23, 
1942) (on file with the Robert H. Jackson Papers, Library of Congress)). 
96. Id.; see also Belknap, supra note 35, at 79. 
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The release of Jackson's memorandum seemingly doomed 
aspirations to reach a unanimous determination; however, Frankfurter 
responded by circulating a document titled F.F. 's Soliloquy.91 This 
imaginary dialogue with the saboteurs castigated them for having the 
temerity to pursue habeas corpus writs and for sowing the "seeds of a 
bitter conflict involving the President, the courts and Congress. "98 The 
document concomitantly admonished the brethren through an 
impassioned patriotic appeal against igniting an ethereal constitutional 
debate when the nation was at total war. 99 
Shortly after Justice Jackson had read the Soliloquy, he decided not 
to publish a concurring opinion. 100 Justice Roberts similarly responded 
that he would support some type of compromise: "a sort of Northern 
Pacific formulation in as brief a form as possible as Black suggests." 101 
The Chief Justice continued with "patient negotiations" 102 and 
subsequently brokered an amicable resolution in which his colleagues 
"agreed to disagree without adopting either Memorandum A or B," 
while Stone announced the Court's decision on October 29, 1942. 103 
In sum, review of the factual background which underlies Ex parte 
Quirin reveals those facts were sui generis. Perhaps most important, the 
factual scenario reflected the exceptional circumstances that pertained 
near the time at which the United States entered World War II and the 
fears that the Nazi saboteurs provoked in U.S. society. The next 
Section descriptively and critically analyzes the Supreme Court opinion 
in Ex parte Quirin. 
B. The Opinion in Quirin 
1. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court purposefully resolved the appeal on the 
narrowest conceivable grounds, so remarking in specific terms, as well 
97. Felix Frankfurter, F.F. 's Soliloquy (Oct. 23, 1942), reprinted in 5 GREEN 
BAG 2D 438 (2002). 
98. See id. at 439; see also Danelski, supra note 35, at 77. 
99. See Frankfurter, supra note 97; see also infra notes 139-40 and 
accompanying text. 
100. See Danelski, supra note 35, at 78 (citing Notes Exchanged By Justices 
Felix Frankfurter & Robert Jackson (Oct. 1942) (on file with the Frankfurter Papers, 
Harvard Law School)). 
101. Id. (citing Letter from Justice Owen Roberts to Justice Felix Frankfurter 
(n.d.) (on file with the Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School)). 
102. Id. (citing Letter from Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone to Roger Nelson 
(Nov. 30, 1942) (on file with the Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Library of Congress)). 
103. See Danelski, supra note 35, at 78-79. See generally Quirin, 317 U.S. 1. 
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as explicitly declined to address numerous particular factual and legal 
matters. For example, the Justices neither performed a thoroughgoing 
review of the substantive claims against, and defenses asserted by, the 
saboteurs nor of the procedures employed to test them. This scrutiny 
derived in large measure from the litigants' agreement that searching 
review exceeded the capacity of the Supreme Court, given the 
circumstances, such as temporal restraints, under which the matter was 
argued and decided. Indeed, most of Quirin's facts were stipulated and 
undisputed, 104 while Chief Justice Stone observed "[w]e are not here 
concerned with any question of the guilt or innocence of petitioners. "105 
The Supreme Court correspondingly declined to resolve specific legal 
issues. For instance, the Justices left undecided whether presidential 
authority itself sufficed to establish military tribunals or whether 
lawmakers "may restrict the power of the Commander in Chief to deal 
with enemy belligerents," principally because Congress had "authorized 
trial of offenses against the law of war before such commissions. "106 
The Court also stated that it had "no occasion now to define with 
meticulous care the ultimate boundaries of the jurisdiction of military 
tribunals to try persons according to the law of war" 107 and held only 
that the defendants' "particular acts constitute an offense against the law 
of war which the Constitution authorizes to be tried by military 
commission." 108 
The Justices first considered the government's argument that the 
Proclamation issued by the Roosevelt administration specifically barred 
petitioners from seeking relief in the federal courts because the 
individuals held the status of "enemy aliens" and had participated in the 
activities we recounted earlier. 109 Despite the Proclamation's express 
terms, which ostensibly foreclosed judicial scrutiny, the Justices 
entertained the saboteurs' habeas corpus applications, stating "there is 
104. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20. We reproduce many Quirin facts supra Part 
II.A. 
105. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25. For example, the Supreme Court did not resolve 
the question of whether one saboteur had actually lost his U.S. citizenship. See id. at 
37-38; infra note 119 and accompanying text. 
106. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 47, 29; see also infra notes 115-20 and 
accompanying text. 
107. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45-46; see also infra note 127 and accompanying text. 
108. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 46; see also infra note 128 and accompanying text. 
109. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24-25. "Enemy aliens" is the term that the Supreme 
Court actually employed. See id. at 25; see also supra notes 36-45 and accompanying 
text. 
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certainly nothing in the Proclamation to preclude access to the courts for 
determining its applicability tO the particular Case. "110 
The Supreme Court admonished that the federal judiciary should 
not invalidate petitioners' trial and detention-which the president had 
ordered through exercise of Commander in Chief authority during 
wartime-absent the clear conviction that they violate the Constitution or 
statutes. 111 The High Court surveyed the power that Articles I and II of 
the Constitution delegate to provide for the common defense. 112 The 
Justices concluded the President possesses broad authority for waging 
war that Congress has declared and for effectuating all legislation that 
prescribes war's conduct as well as defines and punishes "offenses 
against the law of nations. " 113 When the Court canvassed the Articles of 
War, it ascertained Congress had explicitly provided that military 
commissions "shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against 
the law of war in appropriate cases. "114 
The Justices then inquired "whether any of the acts charged is an 
offense against the law of war cognizable before a military tribunal, and 
if so whether the Constitution prohibits the trial. " 115 The Supreme Court 
determined, "[b]y universal agreement and practice, the law of war 
draws a distinction between . . . lawful and unlawful combatants": The 
former are "subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by 
opposing military forces. "116 Unlawful combatants, such as the enemy 
"who without uniform comes secretly through the lines" to wage war 
through destruction of life or property, are "offenders against the law of 
war subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals. "117 The 
Justices classified the saboteurs in the latter category, ascertaining the 
first charge's initial specification sufficed to "charge all the petitioners 
with the offense of unlawful belligerency, trial of which" was within the 
commission's jurisdiction. 118 The Court observed that the saboteurs 
were not "any the less belligerents" because some were U.S. citizens or 
because they had not "actually committed or attempted to commit any 
llO. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25; see In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 9 (1946) (stating 
that Congress "has not withdrawn [jurisdiction}, and the Executive branch" could not 
unless the habeas corpus writ were suspended). 
lll. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25. 
112. See id. at 25-29; see also U.S. CONST. arts. 1-11. 
ll3. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26. 
114. Id. at 28. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW § 3-7' at 670 (3d ed. 2000). 
ll5. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29. 
ll6. Id. at 30-31. 
ll7. Id. at 31. 
I 18. See id. at 36. 
0 
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act of depredation" or entered an area of active military operations. 119 
"The offense was complete when" each individual, who was an enemy 
belligerent, passed or went behind U.S. "military and naval lines and 
defenses ... in civilian dress and with hostile purpose. "120 
The Court next considered the merits of petitioners' substantive 
arguments that the Fifth Amendment entitled them to "presentment or 
indictment of a grand jury" and that Article III, Section II and the Sixth 
Amendment entitled them to trial by jury in a civil court. 121 The Justices 
said "long-continued and consistent interpretation" meant the 
constitutional provisos could not "be taken to have extended the right to 
demand a jury to trials by military commission, or to have required that 
offenses against the law of war not triable by jury at common law be 
tried only in the civil courts. "122 The Court did assume that certain 
offenses against the law of war are "constitutionally triable only by a 
jury, "123 a holding which it had propounded in Ex parte Milligan. 124 
Petitioners emphasized this case for the proposition that the law of 
war "can never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the 
authority of the government, and where the courts are open and their 
process unobstructed. "125 However, the Justices attempted to distinguish 
the important opinion because Milligan "was not an enemy belligerent," 
while they apparently limited the earlier decision to its specific facts and 
treated the determination as inapplicable to the present case. 126 
Finally, the Court considered it unnecessary to delineate "with 
meticulous care the ultimate boundaries" of military tribunals' 
jurisdiction, because petitioners, "upon the conceded facts, were plainly 
within those boundaries. "127 The Justices, therefore, held only that the 
particular acts committed were an "offense against the law of war which 
the Constitution authorizes to be tried by military commission." 128 
The Court was "unanimous in its conclusion that the Articles in 
question could not at any stage of the proceedings afford any basis for 
119. Id. at 38; see also TRIBE, supra note 114, § 3-5, at 300 n.185. 
120. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38. 
121. Id. at 38-45; see also U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2; Id. amends. V-VI. 
122. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 40. See generally TRIBE, supra note 114, § 3-5, at 
299-300. 
123. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29. 
124. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); see REHNQUIST, supra note 55, at 128-37; 
Katyal & Tribe, supra note 8, at 1286 n.102. 
125. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45 (quoting Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121). 
126. See id. at 45-46. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, IR., DANIEL I. 
MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 47-50 (4th ed. 1996, 2002 Supp.) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]; 
Katyal & Tribe, supra note 8, at 1277-87. 
127. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45-46 (emphasis added). 
128. Id. at 46. 
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issuing the writ," 129 yet it lacked a majority who agreed on the 
"appropriate grounds for decision. "130 Some Justices believed that 
"Congress did not intend the Articles of War to govern a Presidential 
military commission convened for the determination of questions 
relating to admitted enemy invaders. "131 Nonetheless, other Justices 
thought that the Articles covered this tribunal but the specific ones did 
"not foreclose the procedure prescribed by the President or that shown 
to have been employed" by the Commission. 132 
2. CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
A number of considerations warrant restricting the op1mon in 
Quirin. For example, the decision evidences the alacrity with which the 
government prosecuted the saboteurs and the Supreme Court ratified the 
military commission deliberations as well as the complications of 
rationalizing the Court's determination after the United States had 
invoked a quickly drafted, terse per curiam order when it executed six 
of the eight petitioners. 133 More specifically, Chief Justice Stone, who 
penned the opinion, characterized the attempt to justify the result as a 
"mortification of the flesh," 134 while the Supreme Court members could 
not articulate the reasoning for their conclusion. 135 Quin'n also evinces 
the wartime context when, for instance, national security concerns have 
traditionally undermined, and perhaps eclipsed, civil liberties. 136 At a 
crucial juncture in the complex, delicate negotiations over a final 
decision, Justice Jackson even circulated a memorandum which 
suggested that the Court had exceeded its authority by considering the 
Roosevelt administration Order. 137 
129. Id. at 47. 
130. Id.; see also supra notes 80, 92-103, and accompanying text. 
131. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 47. 
132. Id. at 47-48. 
133. See id. at 18. See generally supra note l. 
134. See MASON, supra note 71, at 659; Danelski, supra note 35, at 72; Turley, 
supra note 47. 
135. See supra notes 80, 92-103, 129-32, and accompanying text. 
136. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: 
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990); REHNQUIST, supra note 55; 
TRIBE, supra note 114, § 4-6, at 670; Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 
37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 191-93 (1962). 
137. "[Elxperience shows the judicial system is ill-adapted to deal with matters 
in which we must present a united front to a foreign foe." Jackson Memorandum, supra 
note 95. The war power "usually is invoked in haste ... when calm legislative 
consideration of constitutional limitation is difficult. It is executed in a time of patriotic 
fervor that makes moderation unpopular. And, worst of all, it is interpreted by judges 
under the influence of the same passions and pressures." Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller 
Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Duncan v. 
2003:309 Quirin Revisited 331 
The opinion concomitantly reflects inappropriate pressures from 
without, exerted most significantly by President Roosevelt, to validate 
the saboteurs' swift trial, prompt conviction, and severe punishment138 
as well as related machinations within the Court, especially implicating 
Justice Frankfurter. The jurist's soliloquy included a hypothetical 
dialogue with the dead saboteurs that excoriated them and admonished 
his colleagues against precipitating a constitutional crisis when the nation 
was engaged in total war. 139 Even Frankfurter ultimately acknowledged 
that Quirin was "not a happy precedent. "140 Two decades after the 
ruling's issuance, Justice William 0. Douglas lamented: "Our 
experience with [Quirin] indicated ... to all of us that is extremely 
undesirable to announce a decision on the merits without an opinion 
accompanying it. Because once the search for the grounds ... is made, 
sometimes those grounds crumble. "141 Moreover, as Chief Justice Stone 
argued, the case was extraordinary and should be limited to its peculiar 
facts. 142 Numerous commentators have urged that the decision be read 
narrowly, and prominent observers, namely Professors Neal K. Katyal, 
Laurence H. Tribe, and Jonathan Turley, have even repudiated it, 
analogizing Quirin to Korematsu, the discredited case that permitted 
internment of Japanese Americans. 143 
In sum, certain aspects of Quirin are so salient to the issues that we 
consider in our article that they warrant emphasis and reiteration. First, 
the Supreme Court did exercise jurisdiction. This is critical because 
Roosevelt's Proclamation, which served as the model for the Bush 
Order, purportedly deprived federal courts of jurisdiction. Second, the 
Justices addressed, and resolved on the merits, the petitioners' 
Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 357 (1946) (Burton, J., dissenting). See generally TRIBE, 
supra note 114, § 4-6, at 670. 
138. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 35, at 50-53; Katya! & Tribe, supra note 8, 
at 1291; supra notes 46-55. 
139. See Frankfurter, supra note 97, at 439-40; G. Edward White, Felix 
Frankfuner's "Soliloquyn in Ex pane Quirin, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 423 (2002). See 
generally EDWARD SAMUEL CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION (1947). 
140. See Danelski, supra note 35, at 80 (quoting Memorandum of Justice Felix 
Frankfurter (June 4, 1953) (on file with the Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School)); 
White, supra note 139, at 436. 
141. See Danelski, supra note 35, at 80 (quoting Transcription of interviews of 
William 0. Douglas, by Walter F. Murphy, pp. 204-05, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript 
Library, Princeton Univ.); see also Turley, supra note 47. 
142. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45-46; see also supra notes 105-09, 128-29, and 
accompanying text. For similar articulations of the precept that the Court should 
narrowly draft opinions, see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
635 (1952), and Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660-61 (1981). 
143. See Katya! & Tribe, supra note 8, at 1290-91; Turley, supra note 47; see 
also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Warren, supra note 136, at 193 
n.33. 
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substantive claims under the Fifth and Sixth Amendment. Third, the 
High Court's role in any habeas corpus proceeding was extremely 
circumscribed at that time and only permitted inquiry regarding the 
commission's jurisdiction. The next Part of this Article,. therefore, 
evaluates more specifically the precise nature of federal habeas corpus 
when the Supreme Court issued Quirin. 
III. FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS THEN AND Now 
As we demonstrated above, careful scrutiny of the Quirin opinion 
and its historical context limits the present significance of the Bush 
administration's repeated observation that there the Court inquired into 
only the lawfulness of the special military commission's jurisdiction 
over the eight Nazi saboteurs. 144 The Court did frame the issue in terms 
of tribunal jurisdiction over the petitioners and the offenses they 
allegedly committed; however, it resolved on the merits petitioners' 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims as well as their assertions that the 
commission procedures violated the Articles of War. Moreover, the 
parties' extensive stipulation to the underlying facts obviated any need 
for judicial review of those facts or how they were to be proved. 145 Yet, 
assuming arguendo that the Quirin Court had limited its inquiry to the 
commission's jurisdiction, in that term's narrowest sense, 146 Quirin 
would not now support similar circumscription of federal judicial review 
of any detention or punishment imposed pursuant to the Bush Order. 
Even if the Quirin decision mandated such narrow review, that aspect of 
the ruling must be updated to reflect the dramatic evolution of federal 
habeas corpus law over the ensuing sixty years. This Part first recovers 
the law that governed the scope of federal habeas corpus review circa 
1942, the year that Quirin was decided, and then sketches its substantial 
expansion over the six decades intervening between the Quirin case and 
the Bush Order. 
144. See supra notes 104-43 and accompanying text. 
145. See, e.g., Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 607 (observing that the precedential 
significance of Quirin was limited by the parties' factual stipulation). 
146. In any event, we acknowledge that the Quirin Court did not undertake an 
extensive review of the substantive allegations against and defenses of the petitioners or 
of the procedures employed to test those allegations and defenses, in large part pursuant 
to the parties' agreement that such searching review was beyond the Court's capacity 
given the context in which the case was argued and decided. See supra notes 105-09 
and accompanying text. 
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A. Federal Habeas Corpus Circa 1942 
To recover the state of federal habeas corpus jurisprudence in 1942, 
we review the writ's prior development with considerable specificity. 
This detail is necessitated by the complex and often inconsistent 
historiography of federal habeas corpus. 147 Our evaluation ascertains 
that both the case law and the best scholarly assessment of this 
jurisprudence suggest federal habeas corpus jurisdiction was extremely 
narrow when the Court decided Quirin. 
1. HABEAS CORPUS TO 1879 
Centuries before the founding of the United States of America, 
English common law courts used the writ of habeas corpus ad 
subjiciendum, often denominated the "Great Writ," to review legal 
challenges to an individual's imprisonment. 148 At both common law, 
and under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, however, the writ was 
147. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 126, at 1364-68 (discussing 
the historical debate about the proper scope of the writ in federal court). Leading, and 
sometimes conflicting, commentaries on habeas corpus history include WILLIAM F. 
DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS (1980); ERIC M. FREEDMAN, 
HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY (2001); Marc M. Arkin, The 
Ghost at the Banquet: Slavery, Federalism, and Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 70 
TUL. L. REV. l (1995); Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas 
Corpus for State Prisoners, 16 HARV. L. REv. 441 (1963); Clarke D. Forsythe, The 
Historical Origins of Broad Federal Habeas Review Reconsidered, 10 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1079 (1995); James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack 
on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997 (1992); Lewis 
Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 31 (1965); Dallin H. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas 
Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REV. 451 (1966); Dallin H. Oaks, The "Original" Writ of Habeas 
Corpus in the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 153; Gary Peller, Jn Defense of 
Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 579 (1982); Herbert 
Wechsler, Habeas Corpus and the Supreme Court: Reconsidering the Reach of the Great 
Writ, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 167 (1988); and Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 
STAN. L. REV. 575 (1993). Throughout the ensuing discussion, we treat the landmark 
cases in the text and address the relevant scholarly commentary in the accompanying 
footnotes. 
148. A. Christopher Bryant, Retroactive Application of "New Rules" and the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. l, 4 (2002); see 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS§ 53, at 350 (5th ed. 1994); Michael 
O'Neill, On Reforming the Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1493, 1497-98 (1996) (discussing historical development of the writ of habeas corpus). 
See generally William F. Duker, The English Origins of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: A 
Peculiar Path to Fame, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 983 (1978). The writ of habeas corpus ad 
subjiciendum was but one of several forms of the writ of habeas corpus available at 
common law. For a discussion of other forms of the writ, see HART & WECHSLER, 
supra note 126, at 1337 n. l. 
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unavailable to a petitioner incarcerated under a final judgment of a court 
exercising competent jurisdiction. 149 Thus, a prisoner adjudicated guilty 
of a crime and sentenced accordingly could obtain relief through a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus only by attacking the jurisdiction of 
the court which rendered the judgment against him. Merely 
demonstrating that this court committed even a serious legal error when 
it reached the judgment would not suffice. 150 
The "Great Writ" was recognized early on in colonial America. 
Before ratification of the U.S. Constitution, courts in the American 
colonies employed the writ and many adopted the core protections of the 
1679 Act. 151 The Constitution acknowledged and protected this practice 
by providing that "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not 
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public 
Safety may require it. "152 In 1789, the First Federal Congress 
authorized the federal courts to grant "writs of habeas corpus for the 
purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment" when properly 
petitioned by those "in custody, under or by colour of the authority of 
the United States. "153 
ln due time, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the scope of habeas 
corpus review. In 1807, Chief Justice Marshall, in the course of 
resolving one of the first major habeas corpus cases to reach the 
Supreme Court, observed that "for the meaning of the term habeas 
149. DUKER, supra note 147, at 225. 
150. See id. 
151. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 15.2, at 843-44 (3d 
ed. 1999); DUKER, supra note 147, at 115; Max Rosenn, The Great Writ-A Reflection 
of Societal Change, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 337-41 (1983). 
152. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. For opposing views on the meaning of the 
Suspension Clause, compare DUKER, supra note 147, at 126-56 (arguing that the 
Framers intended the Clause to limit Congress's ability to interfere with the availability 
of the writ in state courts, but did not seek to limit Congress's power to disallow the writ 
in federal court), with Eric M. Freedman, The Suspension Clause in the Ratification 
Debates, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 451 (1996) (arguing for a broader interpretation of the 
Clause that would limit Congress's power to narrow federal habeas corpus), and Jordan 
Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to Federal 
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 862, 868 (1994) (arguing that 
"the Suspension Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment together are best read to 
mandate federal habeas corpus review of the convictions of state prisoners"); see also 
Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After INS v. St. Cyr, 33 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 555 (2002). Our analysis, which focuses on the dramatic 
evolution during the last sixty years in judicial interpretation of the federal habeas corpus 
statutes, takes no position in the ongoing debate concerning the proper scope of the 
Constitution's Suspension Clause. 
153. See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82 (1789); see also WRIGHT, 
supra note 148, § 53, at 350-51. 
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corpus, resort may unquestionably be had to the common law. "1s4 
Finally, in the 1830 case of Ex parte Watkins1ss the Chief Justice 
clarified that, in the U.S. courts as in English ones, the writ would be 
unavailable for one confined pursuant to the final judgment of a court of 
competent jurisdiction. Tobias Watkins, who had been the fourth 
auditor of the U.S. Treasury, was indicted and convicted in the U.S. 
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia on charges that he had 
defrauded the Navy Department of approximately three thousand 
dollars. 1s6 The circuit court sentenced Watkins to nine months 
imprisonment and imposed fines on him which were comparable to the 
amounts allegedly misappropriated. 1s7 When Watkins was in custody 
under the sentence of imprisonment, he petitioned the U.S. Supreme 
Court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the indictment had failed 
to charge a criminal offense cognizable in the federal circuit court. lss 
Chief Justice Marshall, who wrote for a unanimous Court, refused 
the writ. 1s9 Marshall first reaffirmed that English legal history properly 
informed the Court's efforts to delineate the scope of federal judicial 
power to issue the writ of habeas corpus. 160 He then applied this lesson 
by initially noticing that English law denied the writ to persons who 
were imprisoned pursuant to a criminal conviction imposed by a court of 
competent jurisdiction and then concluding that the same limitation 
governed the power of a federal court to grant the writ. 161 After the 
Chief Justice recognized that the authority to grant the writ included the 
power to "inquire into the sufficiency of [the] cause" of a prisoner's 
commitment, he asked rhetorically "but if [that cause] be the judgment 
of a court of competent jurisdiction . . . is not that judgment in itself 
sufficient cause? Can the court, upon this writ, look beyond the 
154. Ex pane Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-94 (1807). 
155. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830). 
156. Watkins, 28 U.S. at 195-96. 
157. Ex Pane Watkins, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568, 571 (1833). 
158. Watkins, 28 U.S. at 370. 
159. Id. at 376. 
160. Id. at 370-71; see also supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
161. Watkins, 28 U.S. at 371; see Bator, supra note 147, at 466. But see 
Liebman, supra note 147, at 2060 (denying that Watkins limited habeas corpus review to 
jurisdictional claims); Peller, supra note 147, at 611-12 (same conclusion). For a 
detailed response to Professors Liebman and Peller on this point, see Forsythe, supra 
note 147, at 1147-61. However one resolves this debate concerning the best reading of 
Watkins between Bator and Forsythe, on the one hand, and Liebman and Peller, on the 
other, we think it clear that in 1942 the Justices embraced the orthodox understanding of 
the ruling set forth in the text and reflected in the Bator and Forsythe articles, rather 
than the revisionist view of the case articulated long after Quirin had been decided. See 
infra notes 209-36 and accompanying text. 
0 
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judgment, and reexamine the charges on which it was rendered. "162 
Lest there be any doubt as to how Marshall would answer these 
questions, he added: 
A judgment, in its nature, concludes the subject on which it is 
rendered, and pronounces the law of the case. The judgment 
of a court of record, whose jurisdiction is final, is as 
conclusive on all the world as the judgment of this court would 
be. It is as conclusive on this court as on other courts. It puts 
an end to inquiry concerning the fact, by deciding it. 163 
The Chief Justice's application of the "jurisdiction" test to the 
claims raised by petitioner Watkins reflected his understanding of this 
test as severely circumscribing the habeas corpus court's role. Indeed, 
Watkins's counsel had conceded that "the judgment of a court of 
competent jurisdiction is conclusive" against a petition for the writ but 
maintained that the writ should issue because the indictment of his client 
exceeded the circuit court's jurisdiction. 164 Counsel for Watkins 
162. Watkins, 28 U.S. at 371. At various points is his opinion for the Court, 
Chief Justice Marshall emphasized that the federal jurisdictional statutes had not granted 
the Supreme Court authority to review federal criminal convictions, such as the one 
resulting in Watkins's imprisonment, by way of a writ of error. See, e.g., id. (noting 
that the judgment of the federal circuit court convicting and sentencing Watkins was 
"withdrawn by law from the revision of this court"); id. at 372 ("We have no power to 
examine the proceedings [in the federal circuit court] on a writ of error, and it would be 
strange, if, under color of a writ to liberate an individual from unlawful imprisonment, 
we could substantially reverse a judgment which the law has placed beyond our 
control."). These passages identify an additional factor which the Court apparently 
considered in construing the writ-a factor that other commentators have emphasized 
and then employed to draw conflicting inferences about the proper understanding of 
federal habeas corpus history. Compare Peller, supra note 147, at 611-12 (arguing that 
the Watkins Court's denial of the writ should be understood as the Court's attempt to 
honor the congressional decision not to authorize Supreme Court appellate review in 
federal criminal cases, rather than as reflecting a narrow view of the proper role of 
habeas corpus generally), with Liebman, supra note 147, at 2096 (arguing that during 
this same period the Supreme Court effectively circumvented Congress's denial of 
Supreme Court appellate review in federal criminal cases by employing the writ of 
habeas corpus liberally to "fillO the breach"). For Professor Liebman' s explanation of 
Watkins, see supra note 161. We fmd these dueling deconstructions of dusty habeas 
corpus precedents intriguing and insightful, in that they undoubtedly uncover an 
important, though perhaps indeterminate, reason federal habeas corpus developed as it 
did. We do not, however, think that these critiques diminish the significance of the 
primary reason Chief Justice Marshall himself identified for limiting federal habeas 
corpus proceedings to questions involving the committing court's jurisdiction-namely, 
that the writ was so limited under the law of England from whence it had emerged. 
Watkins, 28 U.S. at 371. 
163. Watkins, 28 U.S. at 371-72. 
164. Id. at 371. 
0 
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specifically insisted that the indictment had failed even to charge an 
offense "punishable criminally, according to the law of the land." 165 
Marshall rejected this argument, however, concluding that the Court 
could not, "under color of a writ to liberate an individual from unlawful 
imprisonment," inquire into the legal soundness of indictment. 166 
Marshall reasoned that imprisonment under a judgment, even an 
"erroneous" one, was lawful, "unless that judgment be an absolute 
nullity; and it is not a nullity if the court has general jurisdiction of the 
subject. "167 As the circuit court had "general jurisdiction over criminal 
cases," the circuit court must determine "whether the offence charged in 
the indictment be legally punishable or not. "168 Because the circuit court 
"was competent to decide" this issue, its judgment, even if in error as to 
this fundamental point, was nevertheless conclusive. 169 Marshall 
summarized the Court's rationale in sweeping terms: 
The judgment of the circuit court in a criminal case is of itself 
evidence of its own legality, and requires for its support no 
inspection of the indictments on which it is founded. . . . The 
judgment informs us that the commitment is legal, and with 
that information it is our duty to be satisfied. 170 
After briefly distinguishing the cases on which counsel for Watkins had 
chiefly relied, Marshall announced that the Justices were "unanimously 
of the opinion . . . that the writ of habeas corpus ought not to be 
awarded" to Watkins. 171 
To be sure, judges sometimes honored in the breach172 as well as 
the observance173 the rule of Watkins-that the scope of a federal habeas 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 374. 
170. Id. at 375. 
171. Id. at 377. Watkins returned to the U.S. Supreme Court three years later, 
raising a new challenge to his continuing confinement. Although by then he had 
completed his sentence of imprisonment, he remained in custody for failure to satisfy the 
monetary fines assessed against him. Watkins, 32 U.S. at 569. Justice Story writing for 
the majority of the Court concluded that Watkins could not be detained for non-payment, 
absent an additional court order committing him to custody on this ground. Id. at 578-
79. 
172. See DUKER, supra note 147, at 229-30 (discussing mid-nineteenth-century 
Supreme Court cases, including the second Watkins decision, 32 U.S. 568, in which the 
Court failed to invoke the jurisdiction standard). 
173. See id. at 275 (citing mid-nineteenth-century cases and commentary in 
accord with the Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, jurisdictional limit on federal habeas 
corpus review). 
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corpus court's inquiry was limited to ascertaining whether a judgment 
that authorized confinement had been issued by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. But, the occasional neglect of the jurisdiction rule neither 
diminished the clarity of the Watkins pronouncement on this fundamental 
principle nor detracted from the fact that "[b]y the mid-nineteenth 
century, the principle was well established." 174 
This was the state of habeas corpus jurisprudence when, in 1867, 
the Reconstruction Congress greatly expanded the class of persons 
entitled to seek the writ from a federal court. Whereas the 1789 Act 
authorized federal court issuance of the writ only to federal prisoners, 175 
the 1867 statute vested the federal courts with power to grant the writ 
"in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in 
violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United 
States. "176 Although the sweeping breadth of the quoted language 
produced some confusion immediately after its enactment, 177 the 
Supreme Court soon concluded that the 1867 Act did not disturb the 
jurisdiction rule of Watkins or otherwise expand the scope of issues 
cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. 178 In other words, the 
1867 Act clearly extended the federal writ's availability to state as well 
as federal prisoners. The Supreme Court authoritatively concluded, 
however, that when the habeas corpus petitioner was held in custody 
pursuant to a (state or federal) court judgment, the 1867 Act did not 
broaden the federal habeas corpus court's inquiry beyond reviewing the 
committing court's jurisdiction. 179 
2. 1879 TO 1937 
During the last decades of the nineteenth century and through the 
first half of the twentieth century, the Court gradually expanded the 
concept of jurisdiction for the purposes of the Watkins rule. Over these 
many decades, the Court characterized as challenges to the committing 
174. DUKER, supra note 147, at 229 (citing cases and commentary to this 
effect). 
175. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
176. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. 
177. See DUKER, supra note 147, at 230-34 (discussing the impact of the 1867 
Act on the Supreme Court's rhetoric regarding the purposes and availability of the writ). 
178. See generally id. at 239-48. 
179. See id. at 243, 247-48. The 1867 Act did, however, significantly liberalize 
the procedures employed in federal habeas corpus cases, perhaps most significantly by 
directing the federal habeas corpus court "to determine the facts of the case, by hearing 
the testimony and arguments." Walker v. Johnson, 312 U.S. 275, 285 (1941) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting the 1867 Act); see also Alexander Holtzoff, 
Collateral Review of Convictions in Federal Courts, 25 B.U. L. REV. 26, 31-33 (1945). 
2003:309 Quirin Revisited 339 
court's jurisdiction an increasing number and variety of constitutional 
claims, rendering them cognizable in federal habeas corpus. 180 These 
cases undeniably reflect an evolution in the scope of the inquiry 
permissible in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, but they also 
evidence the Court's unflagging commitment throughout this period to 
the jurisdictional limitation announced in Watkins. 181 
The particular cases are myriad/82 but review here of a select few 
can illustrate the significance of all. The 1879 ruling in Ex parte 
Siebold, 183 for example, established the proposition that a court lacked 
jurisdiction to proceed against an individual for an alleged violation of 
an unconstitutional statute and, therefore, that a conviction under such a 
statute was void for want of jurisdiction in the trial court. 184 Although 
Siebold basically expanded the scope of federal habeas corpus, the 
decision also powerfully reaffirmed the Watkins rule of jurisdiction. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Bradley observed that federal courts' 
habeas corpus jurisdiction was restricted by "the nature and objects of 
the writ itself, as defined by the common law, from which its name and 
incidents are derived. "185 Chief among the limitations on the writ was 
that "[i]t cannot be used as a mere writ of error. "186 
Mere error in the judgment or proceedings, under and by 
virtue of which a party is imprisoned, constitutes no ground 
for the issue of the writ. Hence, upon a return to a habeas 
corpus, that the prisoner is detained under a conviction and 
sentence by a court having jurisdiction of the cause, the 
general rule is, that he will be instantly remanded. No inquiry 
will be instituted into the regularity of the proceedings . . . a 
conviction and sentence by a court of competent jurisdiction is 
lawful cause of imprisonment, and no relief can be given by 
habeas corpus. 181 
180. See generally Holtzoff, supra note 179. 
181. See id. at 40-41. 
182. See, e.g., DUKER, supra note 147, at 241-48 (discussing cases). 
183. 100 U.S. 371 (1879). 
184. Id. at 376-77. 
185. Id. at 375. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. (second and third emphases added). Justice Bradley acknowledged that 
the situation might be different if the court petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus was 
authorized to review the judgment of conviction on a "writ of error or appeal," in which 
case the appellate court might "perhaps, in its discretion, give immediate relief on 
habeas corpus, and thus save the party the delay and expense of a writ of error." Id. 
This concession in no way detracts from the force of Justice Bradley's reaffirmation of 
the Watkins jurisdictional rule, but rather merely reflects that even in the nineteenth 
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Indeed, Justice Bradley then strained to fit conviction under an 
unconstitutional statute within the category of errors so fundamental that 
they deprived a trial court of jurisdiction, rendering its judgment 
assailable in a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding. He reasoned that a 
trial court's reliance on an unconstitutional statute "affects the 
foundation of the whole proceedings. "188 This conclusion flowed from 
the maxim that "[a]n unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law. "189 
Thus, "[a]n offence created by it is not a crime," and "[a] conviction 
under it is not merely erroneous, but is illegal and void, and cannot be a 
legal cause of imprisonment. "190 In the instant case, if the Court agreed 
with petitioners' assertion that the federal statutes under which they 
were indicted and convicted were unconstitutional, the federal circuit 
court that had convicted and sentenced them "acquired no jurisdiction of 
the causes," as "[i]ts authority to indict and try the petitioners arose 
solely upon these laws. " 191 
The Justices wrote the next important chapter in the history of 
federal habeas corpus with two early twentieth-century cases which 
implicated allegations that hostile mobs had dominated southern capital 
trials. In the first, the 1915 case of Frank v. Mangum, the Court denied 
the writ, over a powerful dissenting opinion authored by Justice Holmes, 
for himself and Justice Hughes. 192 Eight years later in Moore v. 
Dempsey, Justice Holmes, who then wrote for the majority of the Court, 
distinguished Frank and granted the writ, with Justices McReynolds and 
Sutherland dissenting. 193 Scholars have emphasized the apparent 
inconsistency in these rulings. Some commentators have struggled to 
reconcile them, 194 while others have concluded that Moore effectively 
overruled Frank. 195 
century, good judges were unwilling to let empty forms such as an error in pleading 
triumph over substance. 
188. Id. at 376. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 376-77. 
191. Id. at 377 (emphasis added). Although the Court therefore addressed 
petitioners' constitutional challenges to the federal criminal statutes under which they 
were convicted, it ultimately upheld the federal statutes and accordingly denied the writ. 
Id. at 377-99. Even the modest extension of habeas corpus jurisdiction affected by 
Siebold was later repudiated. See Bator, supra note 147, at 474 n.77 (citing cases). 
192. 237 U.S. 309, 345 (1915). 
193. 261 U.S. 86 (1923). 
194. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 147, at 50; Bator, supra note 147, at 
488. 
195. See, e.g., Peller, supra note 147, at 646-48. For a detailed and compelling 
treatment of the disturbing facts underlying both Frank and Moore, see FREEDMAN, 
supra note 147, at 52-85. Of course, our focus for present purposes on the doctrinal 
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For our purposes, this intriguing question is immaterial, because all 
the Justices reaffirmed the Watkins rule of jurisdiction while at the same 
time gradually broadening the term's compass. In Frank, the Holmes 
dissent and Justice Pitney's opinion for the Court both presumed that the 
writ should issue if, and only if, the mob's influence had deprived the 
Georgia court of lawful jurisdiction over the petitioner. 196 Indeed, both 
opinions acknowledged that a hostile mob could so influence a criminal 
trial as to rob the trial court of "jurisdiction" for the purposes of the 
Watkins rule, thus entitling a petitioner to federal habeas corpus relief. 197 
The disagreement among the Justices turned instead on the different 
significance the majority and dissent attached to the Georgia Supreme 
Court decision affirming Frank's conviction and sentence. Justice 
Pitney, for the Court majority, reasoned that principles of federalism 
compelled federal court deference to that ultimate ruling by the Georgia 
Supreme Court, which was itself "free from any suggestion of mob 
domination, or the like. " 198 Justice Holmes, however, refused to accord 
the Georgia Supreme Court decision conclusive effect, reasoning that 
once jurisdiction had been lost in the trial court, it "could not be 
restored by any decision above. "199 
In Moore, both the majority opinion by Justice Holmes and the 
dissent by Justice McReynolds similarly framed the question before the 
Court as whether the "corrective process" afforded by the state appellate 
courts sufficed to cleanse any taint upon the petitioners' conviction 
amidst the highly charged circumstances of their trial. 200 Neither the 
import of these two decisions should not be misunderstood as an insensitivity to the 
inhumanity of the circumstances out of which each ruling arose. 
196. See Frank, 237 U.S. at 326-27 (reciting the jurisdiction standard); id. at 
347 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (concluding that "[t]he loss of jurisdiction [was} not general 
but particular, and proceed[ed] from the control of a hostile influence"). 
197. See Frank, 237 U.S. at 332-34; id. at 347 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
198. Frank, 237 U.S. at 333. 
199. Id. at 348 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes continued: 
And notwithstanding the principle of comity and convenience (for, in our 
opinion, it is nothing more), that calls for a resort to the local appellate 
tribunal before coming to the courts of the United States for a writ of habeas 
corpus, when, as here, that resort has been had in vain, the power to secure 
fundamental rights that had existed at every stage becomes a duty and must 
be put forth. 
Id. at 348-49 (citations omitted). It was this commitment to the duty of a federal court 
to re-examine afresh allegations of fact that, if true, would rob a state criminal court of 
jurisdiction that prompted Justice Holmes to write the following, oft-quoted, description 
of the writ's proper role: "But habeas corpus cuts through all forms and goes to the very 
tissue of the structure. It comes in from the outside, not in subordination to the 
proceedings, and although every form may have been preserved opens the inquiry 
whether they have been more than an empty shell." Id. at 346. 
200. See Moore, 261 U.S. at 90-91; id. at 93-96 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). 
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majority nor the dissenting opinion in Moore questioned the continuing 
authority of the well-established rule, recently reaffirmed by all in 
Frank, that the writ did not extend to relieve a prisoner from a 
conviction and sentence imposed by a court of competent jurisdiction. 201 
Thus, although the Frank and Moore decisions reflected the Justices' 
willingness to apply the Watkins jurisdiction test liberally and consider 
underlying practicalities (i.e., recognizing that a mob-dominated trial is 
actually no trial at all), these two landmark decisions simultaneously 
evidenced the ongoing vitality of the Watkins rule. 
3. 1938 TO 1947 
In the 1938 case of Johnson v. Zerbst, 202 the Justices, having 
already acknowledged the pragmatic realities confronted by a court 
ruling in the midst of a violent mob, finally recognized the 
insurmountable obstacles faced by an impoverished lay defendant 
indicted in federal court. Justice Black's opinion for the Court in 
Johnson is most often, and justly, celebrated for establishing that the 
Sixth Amendment requires a federal court to appoint counsel, at public 
expense, for an impecunious criminal defendant, absent the defendant's 
waiver of this entitlement. 203 Moreover, Black's opinion is frequently 
cited for its strong statement counseling reluctance to find inadvertent 
waiver of such fundamental constitutional rights. 204 That opinion is most 
significant here, however, because in it Justice Black concluded that the 
trial court's failure to appoint counsel deprived the tribunal of 
jurisdiction for the purposes of federal habeas corpus.205 In 
substantiating the majority's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment, 
Justice Black recognized "the obvious truth that the average defendant 
does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when 
brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty. "206 
201. See, e.g., id. at 94-95 (quoting Frank, 237 U.S. at 335). Justice 
McReynolds did not accuse the majority of abandoning the rule of jurisdiction, nor did 
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, question the rule. As in Frank, the division of 
opinion in Moore concerned the adequacy of the appellate process afforded by the state 
court and the significance to be accorded the state appellate courts' rejection of the very 
same claims of mob-domination presented subsequently to the federal court in support of 
the petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Compare Frank, 237 U.S. at 335-36, with 
Moore, 261 U.S. at 96-102 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). 
202. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
203. See, e.g .• DAVID P. CURRJE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: 
THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 321 n.94 (1990). 
204. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Johnson v. Zerbst, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1028 (Leonard w. Levy et al. eds. ' 1986). 
205. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465-68. 
206. Id. at 462-63. 
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Justice Black remarked that this disability extended beyond the criminal 
trial to the process for an appeal, leaving available for the effective 
vindication of the right to appointed counsel only the habeas corpus 
writ. 201 
Given the subsequent expansion of federal habeas corpus 
jurisdiction,208 these observations alone would easily warrant the writ's 
issuance. But, Justice Black went further and demonstrated that relief 
through habeas corpus was not only necessary to make the underlying 
constitutional right meaningful, but also perfectly consistent with the 
well-established rule that the writ would be granted for only those errors 
which affected the jurisdiction of the committing court. 209 Justice Black 
asserted that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel in criminal 
cases constituted "an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal 
court's authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty":210 
If the accused . . . is not represented by counsel and has not 
competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, 
the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid 
conviction and sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty. 
A court's jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost 'in 
the course of the proceedings' due to failure to complete the 
court-as the Sixth Amendment requires-by providing 
counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain counsel, who 
has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and 
whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the 
Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer 
has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction 
207. Id. at 467. Justice Black's recitation of the facts and procedural 
background of the case included (I) the requirement of the federal rules of criminal 
appeals that any appeal be commenced five days after the conclusion of proceedings in 
the trial court; (2) the petitioner's transfer to a federal penitentiary in Atlanta two days 
after the day on which he was arraigned, tried, convicted, and sentenced; and (3) that 
upon his arrival at the Atlanta prison, he was, "as [was] the custom ... placed in 
isolation and so kept for sixteen days without being permitted to communicate with any 
one except the officers of the institution." Id. at 461-62 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). In light of these circumstances, it was not surprising that, when the 
petitioner finally filed an application for an appeal months later, it was denied as 
untimely. Id. Moreover, these circumstances lent added credence to the petitioner's 
contentions that "after a conviction-he was unable to obtain a lawyer; was ignorant of 
the proceedings to obtain new trial or appeal and the time limits governing both; and that 
he did not possess the requisite skill or knowledge properly to conduct an appeal, . . . 
[and thus] it was-as a practical matter-impossible for him to obtain relief by appeal." 
Id. at 467. 
208. 
209. 
210. 
See infra notes 238-63 and accompanying text. 
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 467-68. 
Id. at 467 (emphasis added). 
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pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one 
imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus. 211 
Lest Johnson be misunderstood as relaxing the strict limitations on the 
availability of relief through federal habeas corpus, Justice Black 
qualified the decision by adding that "[i]t must be remembered, 
however, that a judgment can not be lightly set aside by collateral 
attack, even on habeas corpus. "212 Justice Black emphasized that, 
"[w]hen collaterally attacked, the judgment of a court carrie[d] with it a 
presumption of regularity," and clarified that the burden of proof rested 
squarely on the individual seeking the writ to establish "by a 
preponderance of evidence" that "the trial court did not have jurisdiction 
to proceed to judgment and conviction" because the petitioner had "not 
competently and intelligently waive[d] his right to counsel. "213 Thus, 
merely four years prior to Quirin, even as the Johnson Court 
significantly expanded federal criminal defendants' constitutional rights, 
it assiduously labored to preserve the Watkins rule that habeas corpus 
relief would be available for one confined under a judicial judgment 
only when the court that issued the judgment had lacked jurisdiction. 214 
This was the law's state when three months before Quirin, the 
Court used a terse per curiam opinion for all participating Justices to 
acknowledge openly for the first time that the writ could, in rare 
circumstances, lawfully be granted for serious errors not deemed 
"jurisdictional." Waley v. Johnston215 was an inauspicious case, in 
which a pro se prisoner serving a sentence at Alcatraz sought leave to 
proceed in forma pauperis before the Supreme Court; the U.S. 
government even confessed error in response to his habeas corpus 
petition alleging that he had been coerced into pleading guilty by an FBI 
agent's brutal threats. 216 The district court had denied the petition for 
211. Id. at 468 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 468-69 (emphasis added) (footnote and citation omitted). 
214. In Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, the Court confirmed that properly 
pied factual questions relating to the voluntariness of a habeas corpus petitioner's waiver 
of the right to counsel or trial necessitated a hearing prior to disposition, reversing the 
district court's dismissal in reliance solely on ex parte affidavits denying the petitioner's 
perhaps improbable factual assertions. Id. at 286 (citing Johnson, 304 U.S. 458). 
215. 316 U.S. 101 (1942). 
216. See id. at 103-04. Specifically, the petitioner alleged that, although 
"threats of Federal Bureau of Investigation agents to throw [him] out of a window and 
beat [him] up didn't bother" him, his guilty plea to kidnapping charges "had been 
induced by the threats of a named Federal Bureau of Investigation agent to publish false 
statements and manufacture false evidence that the kidnap[p]ed person had been injured, 
and by such publications and false evidence to incite the public and to cause the State of 
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the writ, even though the warden's return included no denial of these 
specific allegations of coercion, and the court of appeals affirmed this 
denial on the grounds that the petitioner's claims could not be addressed 
in a habeas corpus proceeding.217 The Supreme Court, however, 
accepted the government's confession of error and reversed, concluding 
that the claim of coercion "was appropriately raised by the habeas 
corpus petition. "218 
The facts relied on are dehors the record and their effect on the 
judgment was not open to consideration and review on appeal. 
In such circumstances the use of the writ in the federal courts 
to test the constitutional validity of a conviction for crime is 
not restricted to those cases where the judgment of conviction 
is void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court to render it. It 
extends also to those exceptional cases where the conviction 
has been in disregard of the constitutional rights of the 
accused, and where the writ is the only effective means of 
preserving his rights. 219 
Given the circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court's disposition in 
Waley is unremarkable. Yet some commentators, seizing upon the 
emphasized language and reading it in light of later developments, have 
concluded that Waley marked the demise of the Watkins rule related to 
jurisdiction. 220 
Indeed, decisions that the Supreme Court issued over the second 
half of the twentieth century substantiated this reading of Waley as the 
Washington to hang the petitioner and the other defendants." Id. at 102 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
217. See id. at 103-04. 
218. Id. at 104. 
219. Id. at 104-05 (emphasis added). 
220. See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 148, at 354 (stating that in Waley "the 
Supreme Court abandoned the overstrained jurisdictional fiction" and that "[d]espite the 
language about 'exceptional cases' in the passage [quoted in the text accompanying supra 
note 219], it is now clear that habeas corpus in federal court is available whenever [a] 
state proceeding fails to meet the standards of procedural fairness that the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires of the states"). Indeed, to his present chagrin, one of this Article's 
authors recently reiterated this same overstatement of Waley's significance, albeit in the 
context of an attempt at succinct summary of the writ's evolution on American soil as 
background for an analysis of a federal 1996 statute. See Bryant, supra note 148, at 5-6 
(asserting that "[i]n 1942, the Court abandoned the fiction that the writ was limited to 
convictions void for want of jurisdiction"). As we note in the text, though this 
observation serves adequately when made part of a historical landscape painted with a 
relatively broad brush, it is, for present purposes, too anticipatory of subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions to stand as an accurate comment on the state of the law circa 
1942. 
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commencement of the last chapter in the jurisdiction rule. 221 As part of 
an effort to recover the precise state of habeas corpus law circa 1942, 
however, a reading that equates Waley with the jurisdiction rule's 
abandonment accords this brief, unsigned, and uncontested opinion 
considerably more weight than it alone can bear. As we have seen, the 
limitation of habeas corpus relief to defects which deprived the 
sentencing court of jurisdiction was rooted in English common law, 
expressly incorporated into the 1679 Act, acknowledged as part of U.S. 
law in Chief Justice Marshall's 1830 Watkins opinion, and meticulously 
preserved by innumerable Supreme Court rulings on the proper scope of 
the writ issued over the more than eleven decades between Watkins and 
Waley. 222 Accordingly, we conclude that the rule's interment would 
have required considerably more elaboration and sparked much greater 
controversy than appears in the laconic decision which sufficed for the 
Waley Court. The very use of a per curiam opinion shows that the 
Justices found Waley insufficiently significant to warrant a full-dress 
opinion, let alone to serve as the vehicle for a radical change in habeas 
corpus law. 
Moreover, both post-Waley scholarship and Supreme Court rulings 
evidence that Waley was not understood in the early to mid-1940s as 
announcing a wholesale departure from the jurisdiction rule. First, in 
1945 a special assistant to the U.S. Attorney General published an essay 
on "Collateral Review of Convictions in Federal Courts" in the Boston 
University L<lw Review. 223 This thorough effort to describe what the 
author termed "an entirely new and hitherto unknown form of review in 
criminal cases," which in "recent years . . . ha[d] been rapidly 
developing in Federal jurisprudence," and had been expanding the scope 
of the issues that could be raised on habeas corpus, concluded that the 
"Supreme Court nevertheless continued its adherence to the fundamental 
principles. "224 These "fundamental principles" included the rule "that if 
the petitioner [was] incarcerated pursuant to a judgment of conviction 
for a crime, resort [could] be had to a writ of habeas corpus only if the 
judgment (was] void because the court was without jurisdiction to render 
it. "225 The author elaborated that the Court had in the first half of the 
twentieth century expanded the scope of review available through a 
petition for the writ of habeas corpus by means of "a far-reaching 
221. See infra notes 237-64 and accompanying text. 
222. See supra notes 155-214 and accompanying text. 
223. See Holtzoff, supra note 179, at 26. The essay treated federal habeas 
corpus cases challenging criminal convictions in both federal and state courts. See id. at 
35. 
224. Id. at26-27,40. 
225. Id. at 40. 
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enlarg[e]ment of the traditional concepts of jurisdiction and jurisdictional 
facts. "226 The Court had, however, not departed "from the time-
honored principle that lack of jurisdiction is the only question open for 
consideration on a petition for habeas corpus presented by a person 
confined pursuant to a judgment in a criminal case. "227 The author's 
analysis of countless lower federal court cases decided in the late 1930s 
and early 1940s similarly demonstrated the vitality of the jurisdiction 
rule as a limit on the writ's scope. 228 
Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court in Sunal v. La.rge 
confirmed this scholarly assessment two years later.229 When Justice 
Douglas explained the Court's denial of habeas corpus relief to two 
people imprisoned following their convictions in federal court for 
criminal draft evasion, he addressed in detail the limits on the writ as 
they had evolved over the previous half century. Frankly recognizing 
that the Court had carved out "exceptions" to "the general rule ... that 
the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed to do service for an 
appeal, "230 Justice Douglas found it "plain, however, that the writ is not 
designed for collateral review of errors of law committed by the trial 
court ... which do not cross the jurisdictional line. "231 The Sunal 
petitioners had been improperly denied any opportunity to challenge in 
their criminal prosecutions the local draft board's classification of them 
as eligible for military service. 232 Nevertheless, Justice Douglas relied 
on the above-quoted principle to hold that habeas corpus relief was 
inappropriate because the trial court's error did not deprive it of 
226 . Id. at 41. 
227 . Id. 
228. Id. at 45-46. After an exhaustive, and exhausting, review of federal circuit 
and district court cases from the period, the author summarized their collective 
significance as follows: 
Id. 
While extending the use of habeas corpus as indicated and sanctioned by the 
cases that have been reviewed, the courts nevertheless continued to recognize 
and adhere to the principle that errors at trial will not be reviewed and will 
not vitiate a conviction on habeas corpus, unless the error led to a failure of 
the trial court to obtain jurisdiction or to a divesting of jurisdiction by 
subsequent events. The traditional concept of what constitutes jurisdiction 
has been greatly expanded. In order, however, to render a judgment 
vulnerable on habeas corpus, the defect must be jurisdictional, as that term is 
now interpreted. It is not even every denial of constitutional right that 
renders the conviction subject to collateral attack. It is only such a 
deprivation of a constitutional right as affects the jurisdiction of the trial 
court that vitiates the judgment and makes it vulnerable on habeas corpus. 
229. 332 U.S. 174 (1947). 
230. Id. at 178. 
231. Id. at 179 (emphasis added). 
232. Id. at 176. 
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jurisdiction.233 Justice Douglas succinctly summarized the Court's 
rationale for denying the writ of habeas corpus in the following terms: 
"The courts which tried the defendants had jurisdiction over their 
persons and over the offense. They committed an error of law in 
excluding the defense which was tendered. That error did not go to the 
jurisdiction of the trial court. "234 To be sure, Justices Frankfurter, 
Rutledge, and Murphy all dissented on the ground that the majority had 
applied the habeas corpus precedents with insufficient flexibility, which 
they believed should have been construed as permitting relief whenever 
issuance of the writ was necessary to prevent a "complete miscarriage of 
justice. "235 Of course, the dissenters' failure to prevail emphasizes the 
narrower majority view of the writ's availability. Moreover, the 
subsequent substantial vindication of the dissenters' position by Supreme 
Court rulings issued in the second half of the twentieth century does not 
undercut the fact that much stricter limits on the writ retained their 
authority in the 1940s. 236 
In brief, by the summer of 1942, centuries of authority, first 
English and then American, supported the rule that the writ of habeas 
corpus would be denied to a petitioner, unless the petitioner could 
establish that the court which issued the judgment lacked jurisdiction. 
Throughout the previous six decades, federal courts in the United States 
had intermittently adopted broad interpretations of the term 
233. Id. at 181. 
234. Id. (emphasis added). 
235. Id. at 187 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted); see also id. at 188 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); id. at 193 (noting that 
Justice Murphy joined in Justice Rutledge's dissent). 
236. Moreover, neither of the dissenting opinions in Sunal accused the majority 
of improperly repudiating an anti-jurisdictional revolution wrought in Waley. To the 
contrary, the dissenting Justices emphasized the confusion and inconsistency in the 
Court's habeas corpus precedents, arguing that this very lack of jurisprudential clarity 
permitted the Court to render justice for the petitioners before it within the uncertain 
boundaries of existing law. See Sunal, 332 U.S. at 184-85, 187 (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting); id. at 188-89 (Rutledge, J., dissenting): 
Confusion in the opinions there is, in quantity. But it arises in part from the 
effort to pin down what by its nature cannot be confined in special, all-
inclusive categories, unless the office of the writ is to be diluted or destroyed 
where that should not happen. And so limitation in assertion gives way to 
the necessity for achieving the writ's historic purpose when the two collide. 
Admirable as may be this effort toward system, this last resort for human 
liberty cannot yield when the choice is between tolerating its wrongful 
deprivation and maintaining the systematist's art. 
The dissenters' assertions that, as of 1947, the state of the law governing the availability 
of the writ was anything but clear provides additional evidence that the Court's April 
1942 per curiam opinion in Waley did not of its own force throw off the long-honored 
rule that the writ would issue only to redress errors deemed to deprive the criminal trial 
court of jurisdiction. 
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"jurisdiction" for these purposes, but the Supreme Court's eventual 
abandonment of this limitation only happened well after the Court 
confronted and denied the petitions for the writ filed on behalf of the 
Nazi saboteurs in 1942. The present significance of this observation 
about the legal context in which the Quirin Court ruled is explored in 
Part IV. However, we first briefiy summarize the Supreme Court's 
significant expansion of federal habeas corpus during the sixty years 
since Quirin was decided. 
B. Growth of Federal Habeas Corpus Since 1942 
The story of the writ's expansion in the second half of the twentieth 
century can be treated with much greater brevity than its pre-Quirin 
history, as the more recent events are comparatively familiar and less 
controversy surrounds their proper description. 237 In short, the doctrinal 
change which Waley only tentatively suggested became the law of the 
land. The Court ultimately abandoned the Watkins jurisdictional rule 
and authorized the writ's use to remedy serious errors in criminal justice 
administration regardless of whether these errors undermined the 
committing court's jurisdiction over the offense or the offender. 
In 1948, Congress substantially revised the sections of the U.S. 
Code that authorized and regulated the federal courts' power to issue the 
writ. 238 For present purposes, this statutory revision effected two 
significant changes. First, it substituted a statutory remedy (codified at 
28 U.S.C. § 2255) for the writ of habeas corpus as the means for federal 
prisoners to vindicate legitimate challenges to federal court judgments 
ordering imprisonment.239 We explore below the significance that this 
development had for understanding the Court's subsequent expansion of 
the writ. The second aspect of the 1948 revision that is important for 
our purposes was Congress's codification of the judicially created rule 
that a state prisoner must exhaust all available state avenues for relief 
before a federal court may consider the prisoner's petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus. 240 This exhaustion requirement in turn presented the 
Court with the issue whether, and if so to what extent, a federal court 
237. Controversy abounds as to the normative implications of the writ's post-
1940s expansion. See, e.g., Bryant, supra note 148, at 27-28 (noting the controversy 
sparked by the Court's expansion of the writ in the 1950s and 60s). But few would 
contest the factual assertion that, as a result of the normatively controversial Supreme 
Court rulings in the 1950s and 60s, the federal courts issued the writ of habeas corpus 
far more frequently in the late-twentieth century than in prior eras. 
238. See, e.g.' HART & WECHSLER, supra note 126, at 1341. 
239. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 210-19 (1952) (discussing the 
background to Congress's 1948 creation of the § 2255 remedy). 
240. See, e.g.' HART & WECHSLER, supra note 126, at 1443-44. 
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should accord preclusive effect to prior state court rejection of a 
petitioner's federal constitutional claim.241 When the Justices addressed 
this issue in their 1953 landmark ruling in Brown v. Allen,242 the Court 
finally and decisively repudiated the Watkins rule that the writ of habeas 
corpus would be available only if the error alleged by the petitioner had 
undermined the committing court's jurisdiction. 
In Brown, three North Carolina prisoners filed, in federal district 
court, petitions for the writ on the basis of federal constitutional claims 
that the North Carolina courts had previously considered and rejected. 
Denying the petitions, the federal district judge observed that "[t]he 
petitioner[s] ha[d] [their] day in Court and [their] present positions have 
been rejected by a Court which had and did not lose jurisdiction. "243 
The district judge found dispositive "the procedural history and the 
record in the State Courts, for the reason that [a] habeas corpus 
proceeding is not available to the petitioner for the purpose of raising the 
identical question passed upon in those Courts. "244 The district judge 
explained that in such a case "[t]he judgment of the state court is 
ordinarily res adjudicata, not only of those issues which were raised and 
determined, but also of those which might have been raised. "245 The 
court rejected the petitioner's argument that the 1867 statute, which 
empowered the federal courts to grant state prisoners the writ, mandated 
an exception to the general rule that "adjudications made by the state 
courts in connection with applications made to them will be binding on 
the federal courts" in subsequent proceedings.246 
241. Another issue raised by the exhaustion requirement, and addressed by 
numerous Supreme Court decisions, was when should a state court's dismissal of a 
prisoner's claim for failure to comply with state procedures bar a federal habeas corpus 
court's consideration of the claim's merits. That issue is beyond the scope of this 
Article. For a helpful overview of the problem, see CHEMERJNSKY, supra note 151, § 
15.5.2. A related question is when will a prisoner who files successive petitions for the 
writ be denied relief for this reason alone, that is without inquiry into the merits of the 
prisoner's claim. For a discussion of this issue, see id. § 15.4.3. See generally Randal 
S. Jeffrey, Successive Habeas Corpus Petitions and Section 2255 Motions After the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of I996: Emerging Procedural and 
Substantive Issues, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 43 (2000); Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of 
Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 699 (2002). 
242. 344 U.S. 443 (1953); see also CHEMERJNSKY, supra note 151, § 15.5.3, at 
896-97 (discussing Brown). For a recent re-examination of the significance of Brown, 
see Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus: Part Ill, Brown v. Allen: The 
Habeas Corpus Revolution that Wasn't, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1541 (2000). 
243. Brown v. Crawford, 98 F. Supp. 866, 867 (E.D.N.C. 1951). 
244. Speller v. Crawford, 99 F. Supp. 92, 95 (E.D.N.C. 1951). 
245. Id. at 95-96 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
246. Id. at 96 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Justice Frankfurter, however, in an opinion endorsed by a majority 
of the Court,247 adopted the petitioner's argument. Answering his call 
for Supreme Court clarification and liberalization of the federal habeas 
corpus court's role in his Sunal dissent, Justice Frankfurter concluded 
that the 1867 statute required federal district courts to decide de novo 
both pure questions of federal constitutional law and mixed questions of 
law and fact when they were properly presented by a petition for habeas 
corpus, even if the trial and appellate courts of the incarcerating state 
had previously rejected petitioner's claims. Justice Frankfurter 
emphasized his solicitude for the state courts charged, in the first 
instance in most cases, with the awesome responsibility of administering 
criminal justice.248 He, nonetheless, concluded that Congress's decision 
to extend the federal courts' habeas corpus jurisdiction to petitions 
brought by state prisoners compelled a ruling that "the prior State 
determination of a claim under the U.S. Constitution cannot foreclose 
consideration of such a claim" by a federal habeas corpus court. 249 
Although the Court's holding in Brown was, and has remained, 
controversial, 250 on the point central to our inquiry, a majority of the 
Justices made blindingly clear that the Court had abandoned the Watkins 
jurisdiction rule. Henceforth, a federal court exercising habeas corpus 
jurisdiction could address the merits of a petitioner's federal 
constitutional challenge to a state-court criminal conviction, even though 
a state court of competent jurisdiction had previously considered and 
247. Although Justice Reed delivered the "opinion of the Court" resolving the 
three consolidated appeals before the Court in Brown v. Allen, Justices Black, Douglas, 
Burton, and Clark endorsed Justice Frankfurter's discussion of "the bearing of the 
proceedings in the State courts upon the disposition of the application for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the Federal District Courts." Brown, 344 U.S. at 497 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 513 (opinion of Justices Black 
and Douglas); id. at 487-88 (opinion of Justices Burton and Clark). Justice 
Frankfurter's opinion in Brown has been recognized as authoritative by both the Court, 
see, e.g., Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 288 (1992) (plurality); id. at 300 (O'Connor, 
J., concurring), and commentators, see, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 126, at 
1356-57. 
248. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 497-98: 
Experience may be summoned to support the belief that most claims in these 
attempts to obtain review of State convictions are without merit. Presumably 
they are adequately dealt with in the State courts. Again, no one can feel 
more strongly than 1 do that a casual, unrestricted opening of the doors of 
the federal courts to these claims not only would cast an undue burden upon 
those courts, but would also disregard our duty to support and not weaken 
the sturdy enforcement of their criminal laws by the States. 
249. Id. at 500 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(noting that under a contrary holding "the State court would have the final say which the 
Congress, by the Act of 1867, provided it should not have"). 
250. For a discussion of the controversy sparked by Brown, in both Congress 
and legal academia, see Bryant, supra note 148, at 27-29. 
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rejected that same challenge.251 Only Justice Jackson, writing 
separately, indicated that he would have preserved the rule of 
jurisdiction as a limitation on federal habeas corpus review of state 
convictions. 252 The 1953 decision in Brown clarified that federal habeas 
corpus relief extended to state court errors of federal constitutional law, 
regardless of whether the errors were deemed to have affected the state 
court's jurisdiction or whether a federal habeas corpus proceeding was 
the only available avenue for relief. 
The Supreme Court waited another sixteen years to elucidate that 
the same liberal principles, articulated in Brown, controlled the 
availability of collateral relief to a prisoner incarcerated under the 
sentence of a federal criminal court. In this period, the lower federal 
courts had divided, and many had held that relief under 28 U.S.C. § 
2255 would not be available for claims that had been, or could have 
been, raised in a direct appeal from the federal conviction.253 In 
Kaufma.n v. United States,254 the Supreme Court finally rejected this 
distinction and recognized a parity between the relief available to state 
prisoners in federal habeas corpus proceedings and that available to 
251. See generally Bator, supra note 147, at 499-500. Other commentators 
have perceptively observed that the Court's decision in Brown proved essential to the 
Warren Court's 1960s reformation of the criminal justice system within the States. The 
Supreme Court lacked the capacity to review and reverse every state court conviction 
that contravened its increasingly generous interpretations of the Bill of Rights. 
Accordingly, the federal district courts, exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction, assumed 
responsibility for guaranteeing faithful adherence to the Supreme Court's rulings. As one 
commentator put the matter: 
the growth in the size of the country and the amount of litigation meant that 
review by the United States Supreme Court was not sufficient to remedy all 
allegedly unconstitutional convictions. If there was to be federal court 
review of state court procedures, it would have to be undertaken primarily in 
the district courts through habeas corpus. 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 151, § 15.2, at 847; see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 
126, at 1361 ("The broad scope of habeas relitigation authorized in Brown and 
reaffirmed in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), is often seen as an important or even 
necessary aspect of the Warren Court's effort to ensure that its criminal procedure 
decisions were followed by state courts."); Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Coun, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 
1041 (1977) (explaining that "an expanded federal writ of habeas corpus" provided a 
"remedial counterpart to the constitutionalization of criminal procedure"); Barry 
Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REv. 247, 253-54 (1988) ("[T)he Court 
expanded the scope of the writ of habeas corpus in Brown because the Court recognized 
that it no longer could shoulder the burden on direct review of scrutinizing constitutional 
claims arising in state criminal proceedings."). 
252. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 544-45 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
253. See DUKER, supra note 147, at 259 n.189 (citing lower federal court 
decisions). 
254. 394 U.S. 217 (1969). 
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federal prisoners in § 2255 cases, the remedial mechanism enacted by 
Congress in 1948 as a substitute for federal prisoner petitions for writs 
of habeas corpus.255 
That the ambiguity regarding § 2255's scope persisted for so long 
shows that the reformulation and expansion of habeas corpus in Brown 
was a dramatic one, extended to the closely analogous proceedings 
under § 2255 only after much time and deliberate consideration as well 
as Supreme Court resolution of a longstanding disagreement among the 
lower federal courts. This delay, if not reluctance, in embracing the 
theoretical implications of Brown reveals that habeas corpus's narrow 
conception, which was captured most clearly by the Watkins 
requirement that the committing court be found to have lacked 
jurisdiction before the writ would issue, echoed through the case law 
well into the second half of the twentieth century. The staying power 
which this cramped view of the writ thus displayed provides additional 
evidence for our thesis that the narrowness of Supreme Court scrutiny in 
Quirin comported with the then-dominant understanding of the writ. 
This history further undermines the Bush administration's argument that 
this same narrowness reflected instead the Court's deliberate 
endorsement of a de minimus judicial role in reviewing any detention or 
punishment ordered by presidentially authorized military commissions. 
Additional post-Brown Supreme Court opinions reaffirmed and 
extended the principle that the federal writ of habeas corpus would 
generally be available to remedy constitutional errors infecting criminal 
convictions. Perhaps chief among these rulings is the Supreme Court's 
decision in Fay v. Noia. 256 The Court held that a habeas corpus 
petitioner could raise constitutional challenges to a state-court criminal 
conviction which were not previously presented to the state courts, as 
long as the petitioner had not "deliberately by-passed ... the state 
courts. "257 For present purposes, even more important than this 
generous holding258 was the unwavering commitment to a broad 
conception of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction evidenced by Justice 
Brennan's opinion for the Court. Justice Brennan wrote of "the 
extraordinary prestige of the Great Writ," which he insisted had 
255. Id. at 220-22. 
256. 372 U.S. 391. The Court on the same day also ruled in the companion 
case to Noia, Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), which identified particular 
circumstances in which a federal habeas corpus court might disregard state court factual 
determinations. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 151, at 905. 
257. Noia, 372 U.S. at 438. 
258. Indeed, the precise holding of Noia was revisited and overruled implicitly 
in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), and this implicit overruling was in turn 
made explicit in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). See generally 
CHEMERJNSKY, supra note 149, at 882-86. 
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provided "a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint 
or confinement" for centuries.259 The author conceded that the Supreme 
Court "ha[d] [not] always followed an unwavering line in its conclusions 
as to the availability of the Great Writ" and that its "development of the 
law of federal habeas corpus ha[d] been attended, seemingly, with some 
backing and filling;" yet Brennan found dominant the precedents for 
reviewing habeas corpus petitioners' claims on their merits, which in his 
estimation "overshadowed" the contrary decisions that accorded the writ 
a more "grudging scope. "260 Therefore, Justice Brennan reaffirmed in 
sweeping terms Brown's teaching that constitutional challenges to 
criminal convictions could be relitigated in federal habeas corpus 
proceedings: "conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation 
cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal 
constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the 
fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review. "261 
To be sure, the Warren Court's enlargement of the federal habeas 
corpus writ experienced retrenchment during the tenures of Chief 
Justices Warren Burger and William Rehnquist. 262 Despite the 
significance of these developments for the categories of cases affected, 
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have not overruled Brown's holding 
that constitutional challenges may generally be relitigated in federal 
habeas corpus cases. 263 Moreover, there has been no hint that the 
259. See Noia, 372 U.S. at 399-400. 
260. Id. at 411-13. Thus, Justice Brennan's historical analysis, which firmly 
rejected "the notion that until recently the writ was available only in a very narrow class 
of lawless imprisonments," id. at 402-03, is in some respects at odds with our treatment 
of this same history. Compare, e.g., supra notes 152-211 and accompanying text 
(reading the Watkins decision as establishing a fundamental limit on federal habeas 
corpus jurisdiction that survived, albeit in modified form, well into the twentieth 
century), with Noia, 372 U.S. at 413-14 (asserting that "the fetters of the Watkins 
decision were thrown off in Ex pane Lange," an 1873 Supreme Court decision). Nor 
are we the first commentators to find unconvincing at least some aspects of the historical 
narrative presented in Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Noia. See, e.g., 
Forsythe, supra note 144, at 1165 (observing that Justice Brennan's "history" in Noia 
has been "thoroughly disparaged by scholars"); Mayers, supra note 145, at 58 (rejecting 
as "without historical foundation" Justice Brennan's assertion that the Court's ruling in 
Noia "merely fulfill[ed] the intentions of the 1867 Congress"). Even though aspects of 
Justice Brennan's history in Noia may be historically inaccurate, the Warren Court's 
adoption of this revisionist account nevertheless evidences the Justices' commitment to 
and entrenchment of the Brown rule permitting relitigation of constitutional claims in 
federal habeas corpus proceedings. 
261. Noia, 372 U.S. at 424. 
262. See supra note 258; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 151, at 847-48. 
263. See generally 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES s. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS 
CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 69-80 (4th ed. 2001) (providing overview of major 
post-Brown developments in federal habeas corpus and concluding that, notwithstanding 
some significant "contraction" of federal habeas corpus by both the Supreme Court and 
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Supreme Court might return to the 1940s regime, in which the writ was 
available to one confined under a criminal conviction if and only if the 
committing court exceeded or lost its "jurisdiction" over the offense or 
the alleged offender. Thus, the scope of review in federal habeas corpus 
proceedings today remains substantially broader than that typical of the 
period in which the Court decided Quirin. 264 
lV. SIGNIFICANCE FOR PRESENT CONTROVERSIES 
We surveyed above ubiquitous, albeit overbroad and unsupported, 
reliance on Quirin as precedent by President Bush and numerous 
additional public officials for many of the Bush administration's 
controversial responses to the September 11 terrorist attacks. ln this 
Section, we explore the present significance of our perspectives about 
how incredibly narrow was the Supreme Court opinion and how 
remarkably underdeveloped was the state of federal habeas corpus law 
circa 1942. 
A. Relevance to Federal Judicial Review of Military Commission 
Proceedings 
Our observations perhaps have greatest relevance for White House 
Counsel Gonzales's claim that any "habeas corpus proceeding in a 
Congress, governing law generally "recognizes the continuing obligation of federal 
habeas corpus courts to scrutinize state court rulings on federal constitutional claims 
independently"). 
264. Though we have focused on the dramatic changes effected in the law of 
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction during the sixty years since the Supreme Court ruled 
in Quirin, we recognize that other relevant areas of the law have likewise developed 
significantly in the intervening decades. Perhaps most relevant to potential controversies 
arising out of the Bush Order or the administration's prosecution of the war on terror are 
the revolutionary changes that have arisen in the constitutional law of criminal procedure 
and in the law governing the administration of military justice. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra 
note 203, at 447-50 (discussing the numerous rulings that "left the contours of criminal 
procedure radically altered by the time [Chief Justice] Warren left [the Supreme Court] 
in 1969"). See generally JONATHAN LURIE, MILITARY JUSTICE IN AMERICA: THE U.S. 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES, 1775-1980 (2001) (stressing the 1951 
creation of the Court of Military Appeals, now known as the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Armed Forces, as a landmark event in the development of modern military justice 
law). International law and human rights have also dramatically expanded. See 
Dickinson, supra note 8, at 1421-32. Thorough consideration of these and other 
potentially relevant legal developments and their possible significance for present-day 
controversies is beyond the scope of this article. We hope, however, that our focus on 
the evolution of the law of federal habeas corpus during the last six decades will lead 
others similarly to situate Quirin in the legal context in which the opinion was issued, 
and to which it should be limited. 
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federal court" challenging actions taken under the Bush Order, which 
most prominently authorized trial of non-U .S. citizens by military 
commissions, would be limited to reviewing "the lawfulness of the 
commission's jurisdiction. "265 Mr. Gonzales justified this restriction on 
the exercise of federal habeas corpus review with express reference to 
Quirin, reasoning that, because the Court in this case framed its inquiry 
vis-a-vis the legality of the jurisdiction asserted by the military 
commission which President Roosevelt's 1942 Executive Order 
authorized, federal habeas corpus review of any action taken under the 
Bush Order would be similarly circumscribed.266 This argument 
assumes both that (1) the Quirin Court's review was unusually narrow, 
excluding from judicial consideration all issues which concerned the 
process employed against the petitioners, and (2) that the Justices 
specially crafted this limitation on the scope of review for the 
extraordinary circumstances of Quirin, thus reflecting the Court's 
recognition that it owed enormous deference to the president's 
invocation of military courts. However, careful assessment of the 
Quirin opinion and clear understanding of the then-current state of 
federal habeas corpus law belie both of these assumptions. 
As we have shown above, the scope of Supreme Court review in 
Quirin was considerably more searching than the jurisdictional label 
might suggest. Perhaps most critical to the issues evaluated in this 
Article, the Justices seriously entertained, and clearly resolved on the 
merits, substantive claims which petitioners asserted under the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments of the Constitution. That treatment assumes even 
greater import because the petitioners had stipulated to certain facts 
which in essence admitted their guilt. 
It is also important to understand that the Quirin Court, when 
framing the inquiry in terms of the military commission's jurisdiction, 
did not adopt a narrower scope of review than the scrutiny exercised for 
more routine habeas corpus proceedings. Rather, as Part III 
demonstrated, in the early 1940s the federal habeas corpus writ was 
generally unavailable to someone who was held under the judgment of a 
265. Gonzales, supra note 6 (emphasis added). Mr. Gonzales's New York Times 
essay provided in pertinent part: The Bush Order "preserves judicial review in civilian 
courts. Under the order, anyone arrested, detained or tried in the United States by a 
military commission will be able to challenge the lawfulness of the commission's 
jurisdiction through a habeas corpus proceeding in federal court. The language of the 
order is similar to the language of a military tribunal order issued by President Franklin 
Roosevelt that was construed by the Supreme Court to permit habeas corpus review." 
Id.; see also supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. 
266. Gonzales, supra note 6. 
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court having competent jurisdiction.267 The Justices' analysis in Quirin, 
therefore, comported with the prevailing view of the writ's scope and 
purpose, even as applied to one imprisoned under the final judgment of 
a state or federal criminal court. The Quirin Court similarly limited its 
review to the legality of the military commission's jurisdiction in 
accordance with established federal habeas corpus practice, not as a 
specially tailored narrowing of broader scrutiny available in less 
constitutionally or politically sensitive cases.268 Therefore, White House 
Counsel Gonzales's observation that the Quirin Court restricted its 
inquiry to the lawfulness of the commission's jurisdiction, although 
technically accurate, does not support his conclusion that a federal 
habeas corpus proceeding challenging the judgment of a military 
commission authorized by the Bush Order should be similarly 
circumscribed. To the contrary, an understanding of the legal context in 
which the Justices decided Quirin teaches that the limitation on the 
Court's review in the case to the issue of competent jurisdiction was 
267. To be sure, the Supreme Court announced its judgment denying the 
saboteurs' applications to petition for the writ three days before the military commission 
convicted the petitioners and sentenced them to death. Belknap, supra note 12, at 473-
74. The Court had acquiesced to the parties' agreement whereby the trial before the 
commission was temporarily halted to permit the Court to hear and rule on what was in 
effect an expedited appeal from the federal district court's denial of relief. See White, 
supra note 139, at 427-28 (observing that "both sides cooperated in shepherding Ex 
parte Quirin to the Supreme Court while the saboteurs' trial was taking place" and 
discussing the different motives that brought the parties together on this point of 
procedure). One chilling reason the parties gave the Court for this odd procedural 
inversion (whereby the petitions for the writ were presented and considered prior to the 
commission's final judgment) was that, were defense counsel to follow the more typical 
course and wait to petition for the writ until after the commission ruled, the petitioners 
might be executed before any federal court had an opportunity to rule on their petitions! 
Oral Argument Tr. at 500, Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (statement of Colonel Royall, defense 
counsel) ("[B]etween the time the Commission takes its action and the time the 
Executive acts there is no period which anyone could safely count on between the 
conclusion of the hearing before the Commission and the execution of any sentence that 
might be imposed[.]"); id. at 505 (statement of Francis Biddle, U.S. Attorney General) 
(noting as an additional reason for the Supreme Court's consideration of the merits in 
Quirin, the "very practical reason which defense counsel has urged and will urge, that 
even if an appeal be granted it might not act as a stay, and the case would very quickly 
become moot"). In fact, a mere five days intervened between the commission's 
conviction and sentencing of petitioners, and the execution of six of them in the District 
of Columbia jail. Belknap, supra note 12, at 474. In any event, in Quirin the Court 
took the unusual step of addressing petitions for the writ while trial was pending before 
the military commission, in effect assuming for the purposes of its analysis (and quite 
correctly, as it turned out) that the commission's ruling would be adverse to the 
petitioners. 
268. The Quirin Court did speak of deference to the President in wartime. See 
supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 96-99 and 
accompanying text; infra note 297 and accompanying text. 
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merely a non-controversial application of then-controlling precedents 
concerning federal habeas corpus reliefs availability. In the intervening 
decades, however, the Supreme Court has authoritatively repudiated 
those habeas corpus precedents. Modem federal courts should 
recognize that the Justices' considerable expansion of the writ during the 
last sixty years has modified Quirin while emphatically rejecting blind 
adherence to this outmoded feature of Quirin in resolving any federal 
habeas corpus cases that may arise out of the Bush Order. 
As we detailed above, 269 a number of Supreme Court opinions 
issued during the 1950s and 60s, most significantly the landmark ruling 
of Brown v. Allen,210 established that in cases which implicated the 
legality of imprisonment ordered by judicial judgment, the writ's 
availability henceforth would not be limited to those petitioners who 
could establish that the committing court lacked competent jurisdiction. 
Rather, with narrow exceptions, the writ would issue to any prisoner 
who was confined under a judgment secured in violation of the U.S. 
Constitution. 271 This expansion of the writ meant the federal courts 
entertained many procedural challenges to criminal convictions that had 
previously been excluded from federal habeas corpus proceedings 
because they did not affect the committing court's jurisdiction, even as 
the Justices had expanded that term in prior rulings. These doctrinal 
innovations, together with the Warren Court's expansive interpretations 
of the federal constitutional protections applicable to criminal 
defendants; radically transformed the nature and importance of the 
federal courts' habeas corpus jurisdiction. 272 
A few instructive examples will suffice here in lieu of exhaustively 
cataloging the kinds of claims judges addressed in post-Brown federal 
habeas corpus proceedings, 273 which would not have been cognizable in 
the early 1940s. As late as 1938, Justice Black had to exert phenomenal 
intellectual force when justifying Supreme Court consideration in a 
habeas corpus proceeding of whether a federal trial court's felony 
conviction of an "ignorant" defendant altogether denied legal 
representation was constitutional. 274 However, a frequent, important, 
and well-established use of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction today 
is in reviewing both state and federal prisoners' claims that their state-
appointed counsel did not afford them constitutionally adequate 
269. See supra Part III.B. 
270. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). 
271. See supra Part lII .B. 
272. See supra note 251. 
273. A catalogue nearer to being complete can be found in 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, 
supra note 263, § 9.1, at 414-56. 
274. See supra notes 202-14 and accompanying text. 
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assistance.275 The charge that trial counsel's performance was 
ineffective concomitantly serves as the vehicle for presenting to the 
federal courts numerous questions concerning the fairness of a 
petitioner's criminal trial. These include whether counsel properly 
investigated all reasonable avenues of defense and presented all 
potentially mitigating evidence to the trier of fact, 276 whether counsel 
made timely efforts to suppress evidence apparently seized in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment, 277 and whether the petitioner had appropriate 
opportunities to confer with counsel before and during trial. 278 Ten 
years ago, the Supreme Court confirmed that a petitioner's claim that his 
self-incriminating statement had been obtained absent compliance with 
the strictures of Miranda v. Arizona219 was cognizable in a federal 
habeas corpus proceeding, 280 even though it would strain credulity to 
contend that such an error deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over 
the case. In 2001, the Justices reaffirmed that a petitioner held under a 
judgment of conviction premised on evidence constitutionally 
insufficient to prove each element of the crime charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt could secure a writ. 281 This ruling underscores the 
extent of the writ's expansion, given the frequent observation in pre-
Brown Supreme Court opinions that "the writ is not designed for 
collateral review of errors of law committed by the trial court," a 
quintessential example of which was the lack "of any evidence to 
support the conviction. "282 
275. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (confirming that Sixth 
Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are cognizable in federal habeas 
corpus proceedings). 
276. See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (setting aside 
petitioner's death sentence due to trial counsel's failure to present potentially mitigating 
evidence at sentencing hearing). 
277. See Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 374-75. 
278. See, e.g., Jones v. Vacco, 126 F.3d 408, 416-17 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding 
that trial court improperly precluded consultation between petitioner and trial counsel 
during overnight recess). 
279. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
280. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993). 
281. See Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225 (2001) (per curiam); see also 1 HERTZ & 
LIEBMAN, supra note 263, § 9.1, at 415 n.20 (citing cases). The Court's decision in 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), recognized one significant exception to Brown's 
rule of relitigation. In Stone, the Court held that "where the State has provided an 
opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner 
may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in 
an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial." Id. at 494 (citation 
and footnote omitted). See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 151, at 897-98. 
Though "[t]or a time it appeared that Stone might represent a first step to overruling 
Brown v. Allen," subsequent Supreme Court decisions declined to extend Stone to other 
constitutional rights. See id. at 901-02. 
282. Sunal, 332 U.S. at 179. 
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Our decision to enumerate these classic illustrations of the modem 
writ's use should not be misunderstood as asserting that defendants 
whom a military commission lawfully tried necessarily enjoy these or 
other specific constitutional protections. However, we do insist that a 
federal court with jurisdiction over a habeas corpus petition brought by 
such a defendant has the power to decide these questions on the merits. 
An anachronistic reference to Quirin's consideration of whether the 
Roosevelt administration military commission's jurisdiction was lawful 
must not preclude a federal habeas corpus court from reviewing 
constitutional challenges to the manner in which the military 
commissions authorized by the Bush Order actually operate. 
Although the myriad issues that will arise from any future Bush 
Order military commission trials defy accurate prediction now, we can 
identify a few questions which will probably arise. First, because Bush 
administration regulations prescribe lax evidentiary standards,283 a 
military commission defendant may object that the admission of certain 
suspect evidence violated the Fifth Amendment right to "due process of 
law, "284 either because the challenged evidence was inherently unreliable 
or because the defendant was denied any meaningful opportunity for 
cross-examination. 285 A commission defendant may similarly challenge a 
conviction on the grounds that it was not supported by constitutionally 
sufficient evidence286 or was predicated on self-incriminating statements 
alleged to have been extracted coercively .287 A defendant who is tried 
before a military commission also may seek to challenge the 
competence, independence, or both, of appointed defense counsel.288 Of 
283. See DOD Order, supra note 19, § 6(D)(l) (providing for the admission of 
any evidence that "would have probative value to a reasonable person"). Indeed, Bush 
administration officials have cited relaxed rules of evidence as a chief virtue of military 
tribunals. See, e.g., Gonzales, supra note 6 (observing that military commissions "can 
consider the broadest range of relevant evidence to reach their verdicts" and that 
"circumstances in a war zone often make it impossible to meet the authentication 
requirements for documents in a civilian court"). 
284. U.S. CONST. amend. v. 
285. The Bush administration's recent reliance on ex parte affidavits in the 
Hamdi and Padilla litigation, see Hamdi, 316 F.3d 450, 472-73 (4th Cir. 2003); 
Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), may foreshadow similar tactics in 
cases to be tried before military commissions. 
286. Cf Fiore, 531 U.S. 225 (per curiam) (holding that petitioner's claim that 
his criminal conviction was based on evidence constitutionally insufficient to prove each 
element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt was cognizable in a federal 
habeas corpus proceeding); see also 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 263, § 9 .1, at 415 
n.20 (citing cases). 
287. q. Withrow, 507 U.S. 680 (holding that petitioner's claim that his 
Miranda rights had been violated was cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding). 
288. q. DOD Order, supra note 19, § 4(C)(3)(b) (providing strictures for the 
employment of civilian defense counsel); William Glaberson, Tribunal v. Court-Martial: 
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course, the same challenges might be lodged against the members of the 
commission itself, which the administration's regulations provide will 
include three military officers "[a]t least one [of which] ... shall have 
experience as a judge. "289 Even assuming that a defendant acquiesces to 
tribunal composition and defense counsel's competence, the defendant 
may challenge the adequacy of defense counsel resources and any limits 
imposed on defense counsel's abilities to investigate and develop a 
meaningful defense.290 Another specific question is the extent to which 
commission defendants enjoy a right to compulsory process and access 
to any potentially exculpatory evidence possessed by the government. 291 
These issues and a plethora of additional questions await resolution. 
Indeed, we readily acknowledge that others who are more seasoned by 
experience in criminal defense generally and in military law particularly 
can delineate additional compelling issues which may well arise. 
Moreover, circumstances will undoubtedly present issues that no one 
can imagine at this juncture. Even so, this admittedly partial list of 
plausible claims evidences the critical nature of the question this Article 
treats-whether a federal court may rule on such issues when presented 
in the context of a petition for the writ of habeas corpus otherwise 
within its statutory jurisdiction. Contrary to Mr. Gonzales's assertion, 
Quirin does not preclude a federal court from providing the ultimate 
answers. 
B. Relevance to Judicial Review of Executive Detention of United 
States Citizens 
In recent federal court litigation challenging the Bush 
administration's extrajudicial detention of U.S. citizens Jose Padilla and 
Matter of Perception, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2001, at B6 (observing that defendants 
before an ordinary court-martial are allowed to select their own counsel, whereas 
defendants tried by a Bush Order military commission may not be allowed to do so). 
289. DOD Order, supra note 19, § 6(H)(4); see also Are Tribunal Rules Fair?, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 25. 2002, at Al8; Richard A. Serrano, Terror Trials Would Mimic 
Courts-Martial, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, at Al. 
290. See DOD Order, supra note 19, § 5(H) (providing that "[t]he Accused may 
obtain witnesses and documents for the Accused's defense, to the extent necessary and 
reasonably available as determined by the Presiding Officer"). 
291. Compare DOD Order, supra note 19, § 5(E) (stating that "[t]he 
Prosecution shall provide the Defense with access to evidence . . . known to the 
Prosecution that tends to exculpate the Accused"), with id. § 6(D)(5) (authorizing the 
presiding officer to deny defense counsel access to "Protected Information," defined 
broadly), and id. § 10 (declaring that "[t]his Order is not intended to and does not create 
any right, benefit, or privilege, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party 
. . . . No provision in this Order shall be construed to be a requirement of the United 
States Constitution"). 
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Yaser Hamdi, counsel for the administration has again relied 
substantially on Quirin as precedent for sharply circumscribing federal 
judicial review.292 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
and the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
partly acquiescing to the administration's litigation position, found their 
roles in scrutinizing the administration's detention decisions to be 
exceedingly narrow and deferential ones. 293 
The stimulus for this article was the Bush Order, which by its terms 
does not apply to Mr. Hamdi and Mr. Padilla, who are apparently U.S. 
citizens. Thus, we have only preliminarily considered the implications 
of our study for their pending cases. Nevertheless, we think that our 
treatment of the Quirin precedent speaks to the controversy surrounding 
the detentions of Hamdi and Padilla as well. 
For these petitioners, the assiduously narrow character of Chief 
Justice Stone's opinion has telling import. Indeed, Judge Mukasey 
conceded as much in his careful, thorough Padilla ruling, when he 
observed that "[b]ecause the facts in Quirin were stipulated," the 
decision "offer[ed] no guidance regarding the standard to be applied in 
making the threshold determination that a habeas corpus petitioner is an 
unlawful combatant. "294 Yet Judge Mukasey then adopted a highly 
deferential standard to review Padilla's potentially indefinite detention-
whether "some evidence" supported the executive branch determination 
that Padilla was properly classified as an unlawful combatant. 295 To 
substantiate this limited judicial role, Judge Mukasey relied primarily on 
an extended quotation from the Fourth Circuit's Hamdi decision issued 
earlier the same year, which had concomitantly invoked a broad reading 
of Quirin as support for the proposition that "the President's wartime 
detention decisions are to be accorded great deference from the 
courts. "296 
To be sure, Chief Justice Stone's opinion in Quirin recognized that 
"the detention and trial of petitioners [the Nazi saboteurs]-ordered by 
the President in the declared exercise of his powers as Commander in 
Chief of the Army in time of war and of grave public danger-are not to 
be set aside by the courts without the clear conviction that they are in 
conflict with the Constitution or laws of Congress constitutionally 
292. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text. 
293. The Fourth Circuit acquiesced more than the Southern District of New 
York. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text. 
294. 233 F. Supp. 2d at 607; see also supra notes 104-05 and accompanying 
text. 
295. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 608. 
296. Id. at 606 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 
282). Judge Mukasey also relied on dicta in the U.S. Supreme Court's June 2001 ruling 
in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001). See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 607. 
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enacted"297-a proposition itself beyond dispute. However, the Quirin 
Court's acknowledgement of the grave context in which it ruled should 
not obscure either how narrow the Court's holding was or that it found 
review of the executive action taken, including consideration of 
constitutional challenges to this action, consistent with the judicial role. 
Insofar as the Bush administration or the lower federal courts have read 
Quirin as expressing a mood of near prostrate deference by the judiciary 
to Executive Branch detention decisions in times of perceived crisis, our 
analysis of Quirin and the historical and legal context in which the Court 
acted suggests that this reading of the opinion improperly and 
dangerously extends, rather than merely applies, the precedent. Instead, 
properly understanding Quirin requires meaningful judicial review to the 
full extent permitted by the prevailing law of federal habeas corpus 
while at once wisely counseling against precipitous intervention in 
matters of national security. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the once 
relatively obscure Supreme Court decision in Ex parte Quirin has 
become critical to legal and constitutional debates about civil liberties' 
import during times of international terror. The Bush administration has 
frequently invoked the ruling to support its numerous aggressive 
assertions regarding authority to wage a war on terrorism. Our primary 
focus is the contention by the Bush administration that the Quirin 
precedent limits a federal habeas corpus proceeding which challenges a 
military commission order to the threshold question of whether 
commission jurisdiction over the defendant and the alleged offense is 
lawful, although we also briefly treat administration reliance on Quirin 
in recent filings that implicate the Hamdi and Padilla cases. 
Our review of the Quirin opinion and of the legal context in which 
the Court issued it contests the administration's assertion that the case 
mandates such an extremely narrow judicial role. Careful study of the 
history, arguments, and most importantly Chief Justice Stone's opinion, 
reveals that Supreme Court review of President Roosevelt's commitment 
of the matter to a military commission was neither as limited nor as 
deferential as the Bush administration has suggested. Moreover, by 
recovering the state of federal habeas corpus law circa 1942, we 
demonstrate that the Supreme Court's characterization of its role as 
assessing the military commission's "jurisdiction" was consonant with 
then-current understandings of the proper scope of inquiry in any federal 
297. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25. 
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habeas corpus proceeding, including those which involved petitions filed 
by prisoners incarcerated under federal and state judicial judgments. 
That the Court declined to accord President Roosevelt's military 
commission any less deference than it gave a lone state or federal trial 
court judge in 1942 must not be anachronistically construed as a 
definitive ruling that judicial review is singularly inappropriate when the 
judgments of military commissions are at issue. Rather, Quirin should 
be limited to its extraordinary facts, as Chief Justice Stone's opinion for 
the Court clearly stated, and understood as a relic of an unduly narrow 
and long-abandoned approach to federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. 
